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Abstract	  	  
Title:  Effects of Disruptive Innovation at an Industry Level: A Case 
Study of Mobile Network Operators 
Authors:  Rasmus Boye and Elin Bäckman 
Supervisors:  Thomas Kalling and Benjamin Weaver 
Purpose:  The primary purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework for 
assessing potential effects of disruptive innovation at an industry 
level. The findings of our primary purpose will contribute to the 
theoretical field of disruptive innovation and have practical 
relevance. In addition we also have a secondary purpose, which is 
that this thesis shall describe how the mobile network operators 
have been affected by the disruptive innovation. 
Methodology:  We have created a theoretical framework and performed a case 
study of mobile network operators to achieve the purpose of this 
thesis. The case study has been conducted through an examination 
of value migration, interviews and gathering of information. 
Theory: Disruptive innovation, value migration, business models and value 
networks. 
Conclusions:  We have provided an assessment framework through our 
theoretical framework, case study and analysis. The theoretical 
framework provided 13 potential factors that can be affected by 
disruptive innovation and the analysis provided two additional 
factors, opportunities for complementors and perceptions about the 
future. The assessment framework can be used either ex-ante to 
analyze possible future effects of an upcoming disruptive 
innovation at an industry level, or ex-post to understand how an 
industry has changed.  
Key words:  Disruptive innovation, value migration, business models, value 
networks, mobile network operators, smartphones. 
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Definitions	  
 
These are the working definitions for common terms used in this thesis:  
App – a software application that is used on a smartphone.  
App store – an online marketplace were software applications can be downloaded to 
smartphones. 
ARPU – average revenue per unit. 
Conventional phone – a less advanced mobile phone compared to a smartphone.  
Data access – a way that mobile phones to reach online services using wireless mobile 
telecommunication networks.  
EBITDA – earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.  
Handset OEM – handset original equipment manufacturer, a company that designs and 
brands mobile phones.  
Infrastructure provider – a company that builds mobile telecommunication networks.  
Messaging – a way of communicating between mobile phones through written text 
messages.  
Mobile network operator – a company that provides telecommunication services and 
often owns and/or operates one or more mobile telecommunication networks.  
OTT player – over-the-top player, a company that delivers software content of mobile 
phones through platforms.  
Platform – a mobile operating system used on smartphones.  
Portal – an ecosystem with content for mobile phones offered by a mobile network 
operator.  
Smartphone – a mobile phone that includes a mobile operating system, and has more 
advanced connectivity and computing capability than a conventional phone.  
Telco – slang for mobile network operator.  
Voice – a way of communicating between mobile phones through voice calling. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
 
In the initial chapter the background of both disruptive innovation and the mobile 
network operators is presented. The background is tied together in the problem discussion 
which leads to the purpose of this thesis. Delimitations are also presented.   
	  	  
 
1.1	  Background 
1.1.1	  Disruptive	  innovation 
The term disruptive innovation was introduced by Clayton M. Christensen (Anthony et 
al., 2008). According to Christensen (2013), disruptive innovations are products or 
services with business models that introduce performance packages that are inferior to 
what mainstream customers value. During the early development of a disruptive 
innovation it only serves niche segments. Both the disruptive innovation and the 
established offerings improve; nevertheless the disruptive innovation improves enough 
over time to satisfy the mainstream customers and eventually replaces the established 
offerings and incumbents that exceed the demanded performance (Christensen, 2013). 
The concept has however been expanded by a number of authors and the concept is often 
used in a broader sense (Danneels, 2004; Dan & Chieh, 2008). 
 
1.1.2	  Mobile	  telecom	  industry	  and	  mobile	  network	  operators	   
The mobile telecom industry is changing and the competitive landscape for mobile 
network operators has been disrupted. The industry has changed from an environment 
characterized by reliability and scale of networks, to an environment where choice and 
flexibility of services is more prominent. This has changed the basis of competition and 
represents the shift from “mobile telephony” to “mobile computing” (VisionMobile, 
2012a). 
 
Mobile network operators launched third-generation (3G) mobile networks in 2001 and 
the high-speed wireless data transfer enabled the mobile network operators to distribute 
more services (Steinbock, 2005). The mobile network operators attempted to control the 
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services in closed ecosystem portals (VisionMobile, 2011). The portals gave the mobile 
network operators the opportunity to build empires and lock-in the customers by 
restricting them from accessing potential competitors services. 
 
The development of 3G technologies provided a foundation for the upcoming smartphone 
era and in 2007 Apple launched the iPhone (Sharma, 2012a). Smartphones had earlier 
been used by a small segment of primarily business people, but the iPhone managed to 
target mainstream customers. According to Ahonen (2011) the introduction of iPhone 
transformed the industry and he refers the demarcation of time in the mobile telecom 
industry as “before iPhone” and “after iPhone”. 
 
The smartphone era has enabled dozens of new services for phones (Sharma, 2012a), 
which were boosted by touchscreens (Salz, 2011). Content of smartphones is controlled 
by platforms such as Google Android and Apple iOS, and not by the mobile network 
operators. It has caused the mobile network operators portals to decline rapidly and made 
them loose some of their interaction with end-users (VisionMobile, 2011). 
 
The mobile network operators have previously been able to generate large profits and 
maintain high margins from the traditional voice and messaging services. But in the 
smartphone era the profits from voice services have are stopped growing and even 
declined for some mobile network operators. The usage of data access on the other hand 
has increased rapidly due to the smartphone usage (Sharma, 2012a). 
 
1.1.3	  Disruptive	  innovation	  in	  the	  mobile	  telecom	  industry 
Disruptive innovation is a relative phenomena, i.e. an innovation can be disruptive to one 
business model but not to another (Christensen, 2006). Christensen (2013) has defined 
smartphones as disruptive innovation in relation to computers. In relation to conventional 
phones, smartphones can also be framed as disruptive innovation since mainstream 
customers did not value its performance package initially, as discussed earlier in the 
background of this thesis. Furthermore, services that have been introduced through the 
platforms have disrupted a large number of markets, for example the mobile network 
operator portals. Moreover, the basis of competition and structure of the entire mobile 
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telecom industry has been disrupted according to Sharma (2012a) and VisionMobile 
(2012a). The disruptive innovation caused by smartphones and its content is hereinafter 
referred to as the disruptive innovation.  
 
1.2	  Problem	  discussion  
Disruptive innovation has completely reshaped numerous companies and industries, and 
caused companies to fail while other flourish. Many firms need to periodically engage in 
processes of disruptive innovation for long-term survival (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
Disruptive innovation has drawn an unusual amount of attention from both scholars and 
practitioners, which is rare (Danneels, 2004). 
 
We have examined research from a number of authors (Danneels, 2004; Dan & Chieh, 
2008; Adner, 2002; Ansari & Krop, 2012; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006; Markides, 
2006; Bower & Christensen, 1996; Charitou & Markides, 2003; Danneels, 2006, 
Schmidt, 2004; Utterback & Acee, 2005; Christensen, 2013; Christensen, 2006; Bower & 
Christensen, 1995; Sandstrom et al., 2009; Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Wessel & Christensen, 2012; Adner & Zemsky, 2005; Tellis, 2006; 
Gilbert & Bower, 2002) to see what previously has been written about the effects of 
disruptive innovation, as a part of our literature review. The effects are often described 
generally or through examples and the focus is on issues as definitions, what causes 
disruptive innovation and how it can be classified, foreseen or handled. There is no 
extensive research on the overall effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level. We 
have been able to identify three major areas that disruptive innovation affects at an 
industry level through the examined research. These are business models, value migration 
and value networks. 
 
Knowledge about the effects of disruptive innovation can help managers understand the 
consequences of their strategic decision-making. Some question the ability of making 
predictions of disruptive innovation in advance (Thomond & Lettice, 2002), but for 
example Christensen (2006) and Govindarajan & Kopalle (2006) emphasize that 
predictions are possible. Hence, findings about the effects of disruptive innovation can 
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result in more cost-efficient investments, which is positive from both a company and a 
societal perspective. Thus new knowledge adds to the theoretical field of disruptive 
innovation, which can have practical relevance. The practical significance can also be 
accentuated by the large interest in disruptive innovation by practitioners (Danneels, 
2004). 
 
We have identified five main categories of the mobile telecom value network through 
gathering information (Sharma, 2012a; Ahonen, 2012; VisionMobile, 2012b) on mobile 
telecom: 
• Mobile network operators 
• Infrastructure providers 
• Handset OEMs  
• OTT players  
• Platforms 
 
All of these parties have faced changes due to the disruptive innovation in the mobile 
telecom industry. For example many handset OEMs have lost dominance to new players, 
while OTT players have been given a new market through app stores (Sharma, 2012a). 
However, mobile telecom is a 1.4 trillion USD industry, which is 2 % of world GDP, 
where mobile network operators have played a critical and dominant role of the mobile 
telecom since its inception. Close to 74 % of the value of the mobile telecom flowed 
through the mobile network operators and they captured 82 % of the profits in 2011 
(Sharma, 2012b). Ahonen (2012) claims that the mobile network operators are one of the 
most unexplored parts of the mobile telecom value network by analysts. Constantinou 
(interview, March 21, 2013) claims that everyone writes about OEMs and their changes, 
while there is a lot of novelty factor in researching the mobile network operators.  
 
Mobile telecom has become critical to drive technological growth, and it impacts how 
humans communicate and interact in everyday life (Sharma, 2012a). The mobile network 
operators have been affected by disruptive innovation as described in the background of 
this thesis. However, no complete analysis with the lessons from the mobile network 
operators in relation to the disruptive innovation is available yet.  
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1.3	  Problem	  definition	   
Based on the problem discussion above we have defined two issues that we will analyze:  
1. How have the mobile network operators been affected by the disruptive 
innovation caused by smartphones and its content? 
2. What can the effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level be? 
 
1.4	  Purpose 
We have a primary purpose we want to achieve through this thesis: 
• This thesis shall provide a framework for assessing potential effects of disruptive 
innovation at an industry level. The findings of our primary purpose will 
contribute to the theoretical field of disruptive innovation and have practical 
relevance.  
 
In addition we also have a secondary purpose, which is that this thesis shall describe how 
the mobile network operators have been affected due to the disruptive innovation. The 
findings of our secondary purpose will empirically add to research on the mobile telecom 
industry.  
 
1.5	  Delimitations 
Our empirical study is delimited to the mobile network operators’ perspective of the 
mobile telecom industry in order to provide a profound analysis with accurate 
conclusions. In the information and data gathering process we have solely gathered 
information related to the mobile segment of the network operators. Some of the network 
operators provide fixed-line services that also may have been affected by the disruptive 
innovation. However, in accordance with our purpose, this thesis is delimited to the 
mobile segment of the network operators. As a consequence, less focus will be provided 
to other segments and other participants in the mobile value network.  
 
The iPhone was launched in 2007, which was an event that enabled the disruptive 
innovation as discussed in the background of this thesis, and our empirical study will 
therefore focus on the time period from 2007 until today.  
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1.6	  Disposition	   
The thesis comprises the following chapters: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the initial chapter the background of both disruptive innovation and the mobile 
network operators is presented. The background is tied together in the problem discussion 
which leads to the purpose of this thesis. Delimitations are also presented.   
 
Chapter 2: Methodology 
The methodology chapter presents the methods used to achieve the purpose of this thesis. 
It includes a discussion of how the examination of value migration, interviews and 
gathering of theory and information has been conducted. At the end of the chapter 
information about how a theoretical framework has been developed is presented.  
 
Chapter 3: Theory 
The theory chapter presents four theoretical fields in accordance with what has been 
presented in the methodology chapter. It leads to a theoretical framework of factors that 
can be affected by disruptive innovation.  
 
Chapter 4: Mobile network operators development  
In the fourth chapter the development of mobile network operators is presented with a 
focus on the time period from 2007 until today. The headings are based on the factors in 
the theoretical framework to provide a clear view of how the mobile network operators 
have changed.  
 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
The analysis chapter begins with an introduction of the analysis. The factors in the 
theoretical framework are then analyzed in relation to the case study in order to provide 
theoretical findings. Additional factors that were found though the case study are 
presented thereafter. The chapter ends with a revised theoretical framework and an 
assessment framework.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The conclusions chapter presents the results of the analysis and discusses how they match 
the purpose of this thesis. At the end of the chapter proposals for future research are 
presented.	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2.	  Methodology	  	  
 
The methodology chapter presents the methods used to achieve the purpose of this thesis. 
It includes a discussion of how the examination of value migration, interviews and 
gathering of theory and information has been conducted. At the end of the chapter 
information about how a theoretical framework has been developed is presented.  
	  	  
2.1	  Choice	  of	  research	  methodology	  and	  research	  design 
Bryman and Bell (2005) describe that the purpose of a case study research design is to 
analyze one or a few cases in detail. Yin (2003, p. 13) identifies the characteristics of a 
case study as something that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident”. Both of these definitions apply to this thesis, since we analyzed the 
mobile telecom industry from the mobile network operators’ perspective to provide an 
assessment framework of potential effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level. 
This is done in combination with a theoretical framework. 
 
We have chosen the above mentioned case study because it is a current and significant 
example of disruptive innovation with sufficient information available. It also fulfills our 
secondary purpose, which is to describe how the mobile network operator have been 
affected due to the disruptive innovation in the mobile telecom industry. 
 
Yin (2003) says that case studies involve one or several cases, which he refers to as 
single- or multiple-case studies. Since our purpose is to provide findings at an industry 
level, we do not analyze individual companies; therefore this is a single-case study of an 
industry.  
 
Case studies can be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive according to Yin (2003). Our 
case study is both explanatory and descriptive, since it seeks primarily to test and find 
potential effects of disruptive innovation and secondarily to explain how the mobile 
network operators have been affected by the disruptive innovation. 
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The research methodology used in this thesis is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the working process of this thesis. 
 
A theoretical framework of factors that can be affected by disruptive innovation has been 
developed by gathering relevant theory (see Figure 1). Information about the mobile 
network operators has been gathered from numerous sources. We have collected financial 
data from mobile network operators’ annual reports to see how value has migrated. Value 
migration is one of the major areas that disruptive innovation affects as discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis. Furthermore, we have conducted interviews with 
representatives from the mobile telecom industry once the financial data and information 
was gathered, to be able to ask the right questions. Then we have analyzed the case study 
in combination with the theoretical framework and revised it based on our findings. 
Finally we have provided an assessment framework of potential effects of disruptive 
innovation at an industry level.   
 
Qualitative and quantitative methods are often combined in case studies (Bryman & Bell, 
2005), and the interviews have been conducted in a qualitative manner. The financial data 
has on the other hand been examined in a quantitative manner since we have examined 
data from multiple firms. 
 
The mobile telecom industry has certain characteristics that differ from other industries. 
The mobile network operators provide access to telecom services through an 
infrastructure that requires large investments and licenses for radio spectrums which 
	   16 
makes it very difficult for new mobile network operators to enter the market (Selén, 
interview, April 23, 2013). The effects of disruptive innovation that are identified through 
this case study may therefore not be relevant to all industries. However, the primary 
purpose of this thesis is to provide potential effects, and it has been achieved though the 
case study in combination with our theoretical framework.  
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2005) it is important to consider reliability and validity 
when research is conducted. The reliability of a research can be determined by asking if 
the research would render the same results if conducted again, and if the results have 
been affected by random events and temporary conditions. The validity examines 
whether the conclusions from the research are related or not. It raises the question if the 
indicators measure the factors they were meant to measure. These definitions have been 
used when we have considered the reliability and validity of our research.  
 
2.2	  Examination	  of	  value	  migration	   
2.2.1	  Gathering	  of	  data	   
In order to provide an explicit view on how value has migrated for the mobile network 
operators data was gathered in a quantitative manner from the examined companies 
annual reports. According to Byrman and Bell (2005) this type of data can be classified 
as a secondary data since the data has been gathered by the companies as a part of their 
regular operations for other purposes.  
 
The selection of mobile network operators was based on Forbes list of the “World’s 
biggest public companies within the telecommunications services” (Forbes, 2013). Due to 
the need of public annual reports to conduct the data gathering, we have only been able to 
study public companies, however almost all major mobile network operators are public 
companies (Sharma, 2012a). In order to determine which mobile network operators to 
collect data from and analyze we chose to view the 30 largest public telecom operators 
based on their annual sales turnover. We chose to focus on the 30 largest companies to 
cover a large part of the telecom industry and because the smaller companies usually 
follow the bigger ones according to Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013). Several of 
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these companies operate in a wide range of segments within the telecom industry, which 
required us to separate the data from their mobile business from the other segments. 
Some of the companies did not provide sufficient information about their mobile 
segments, and data from their mobile business could therefore not be extracted from their 
annual reports. We were able to collect data from the 12 mobile network operators that 
provided adequate information about their mobile segments to fit the purpose of our 
analysis.   
 
The data extracted from the annual reports were revenues, net income, EBITDA and 
number of subscribers between the years of 2007 to 2011. We did not include annual 
reports for the fiscal year of 2012 in the data gathering since several companies had not 
yet published their results for 2012. Some of the mobile network operators did not 
provide net income or EBITDA for their mobile segments, and in those cases we have 
estimated net income or EBITDA by viewing the mobile segments revenue as a 
percentage of the company’s total revenue. 
 
Revenues, net income, EBITDA and number of subscribers has been examined and used 
for calculations to provide an explicit view of the effects caused by the disruptive 
innovation. According to Slywotzky (1996) companies’ market value should be divided 
by their revenues in order to establish were the companies are in the value migration 
process. In our case this procedure was not possible to execute since most of the 
companies we have studied have a variety of business segments and the market value for 
the different segments is difficult to determine, an issue that Slywotzky recognizes. To 
examine value migration within the mobile network operators’ value network we have 
instead use the data collected to calculate profit margin, EBITDA margin and ARPU for 
the chosen companies.  
 
In addition to the studied companies’ annual reports we have also gathered aggregated 
data from the ICT indicators database, which is complied by the International 
Telecommunications Union, ITU. This data will be used to determine how the number of 
mobile subscribers and the penetration rates has evolved in developed and developing 
countries. 
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2.2.2	  Analysis	  of	  gathered	  data 
The data gathered from the chosen mobile network operators’ annual reports have been 
imported into Excel were profit margin, EBITDA margin and ARPU was calculated. 
These ratios were chosen to provide an explicit view over the mobile network operators’ 
development during the observed time period and to determine how value has migrated. 
 
To calculate the profit margin the net income for each year was divided by the revenue 
for the same year. The profit margin measures the amount of the revenue that is kept in 
earnings, and is a useful margin when profitability is measured and compared among 
companies in the same or similar industries (Koller et al, 2010). EBITDA margin is a 
financial metric that can be used to measure the operating profitability of a company. To 
calculate this ratio the companies’ earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization, EBITDA, divided by the revenue. Since EBITDA does not take 
depreciation and amortization into account the EBITDA margin can provide a clearer 
vision of a company’s core profitability. The EBITDA margin is derived from revenue 
and shows the proportion of revenue that remains when operating expenses is deducted 
(Koller et al, 2010). 
 
Average revenue per unit, ARPU, measures how much revenue each user generates. This 
measurement makes it possible to view the company’s revenue growth on a per-user level 
and can be used to identify which products or services that are low or high revenue 
generators. 
 
The mobile network operators in our analysis define their fiscal year differently, some 
use the calendar year while others have split their fiscal year. When the results from the 
companies with a split fiscal year could not be determined on an annual basis we have 
accounted their results as the year of which they end in. The fiscal year June 2010 to 
March 2011 have for example been compared and analyzed as the calendar year of 2011. 
This may cause displacements in the results for some of the companies in our analysis but 
it is still possible for us to capture the trends and larger movements in in the industry. 
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The data has not been adjusted to one uniform currency since we are interested in the 
percentage change for each company, not the increase or decrease in for example a dollar 
amount. The mobile network operators’ development over the observed period has been 
calculated as a percentage change for each company, and this change has been compared 
to the other companies in our analysis. By not transforming the currency we can avoid 
some variances in the result caused by macroeconomic factors. 
 
The data form the ITU has been used to provide a view on how the number of mobile 
subscribers in the developed and developing countries has increased during the observed 
time period. The number of mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants has been used to 
determine the mobile penetrations rate in the world and in the developed and developing 
countries. 
 
2.2.3	  Critique,	  reliability	  and	  validity 
Our data analysis is considered a secondary analysis of data according to Bryman and 
Bell (2005). The benefits of a secondary analysis are primarily that it is a time efficient 
and inexpensive way to gather data of high quality from a reliable source. Since less time 
can be spent gathering the primary data, there can be more time allocated to the analysis 
of the data. The limitation of a secondary analysis is that you are not familiar with the 
data, which also can be quite complex. The data has initially been collected by another 
party, which was not aware of your purpose, so there might be some key variables 
missing and it can be difficult to determine the quality of the data (Bryman & Bell, 2005). 
 
The data has been gathered from some of the largest public telecom companies’ annual 
reports, and since there are extensive regulations associated with public companies 
annual reports the data collected from these can be considered to be credible. The 
information in the annual reports used is publicly available and the same data can be 
gathered at any other point in time. The data from the International Telecommunication 
Union, ITU, is the United Nations specialized agency for information and 
communications technologies, which can be considered as a credible source. This data is 
also publicly available and another gathering will yield the same data, which increases 
the reliability for our thesis. 
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Initially we planned to gather data from the 30 largest public telecom operators in the 
world, but due to the lack of sufficient data we were only able to analyze 12 companies 
mobile businesses. We aimed to capture the effects of value migration in the 30 largest 
mobile network operators because it would cover a large percentage of the industry. The 
fact that we did not achieve that can affect the reliability and validity of our findings 
since it may not be representative for the companies we could not include in our analysis, 
and therefore it may not be representative for the value migration in the telecom industry 
as a whole. 
 
The data we gathered did lack some of the key variables our analysis required, so we had 
to make some assumptions and estimations to achieve the data we needed for our thesis. 
These estimations may affect the results of the analysis and distort the comparison among 
the mobile network operators. Our treatment of the companies with a split fiscal year may 
cause displacements in the analysis since some of the operations will be analyzed and 
compared to a time period different from when the results incurred. Different countries 
have varying accounting standards, which enables the variances in our data set to be 
attributable to different accounting techniques. These factors may affect the reliability 
and validity of our findings since the results may be affected of our assumptions and the 
results may vary in another analysis where other assumptions are made. 
 
Another factor than can offset and displace the results in our analysis is the fact that 
countries and mobile network operators have differing practice when it comes to the 
length of subscriber contracts. For companies or countries were it is custom with longer 
subscriber contracts the effects of value migration may be deferred compared to 
companies and countries were shorter contracts are custom.  
 
2.3	  Conducting	  interviews 
2.3.1	  Preparing	  and	  conducting	  interviews 
Interviews were conducted to achieve a greater understanding of how disruptive 
innovation has affected the mobile network operators at an industry level. The interviews 
	   21 
have been an efficient way to attain additional and deeper insight on the changes for the 
mobile network operators, since these recent changes are not that well documented yet. 
To prepare for the interviews we studied literature and reports concerning the mobile 
telecom industry to achieve a solid knowledge base. Moreover, the data gathering and 
data analysis was performed to get a better view on how the mobile network operators are 
performing. These preparations were conducted to provide well-aimed interview 
questions to enable us to get the most out of the interviews. We tried to arrange 
interviews with all the mobile network operators included in out data analysis and 
managed to reach three of them. 
 
In addition to the three interviews with the mobile network operators we have also 
interviewed one infrastructure provider and one analyst to provide a broad view of the 
industry and the effects of disruptive innovation. The chosen mobile network operators 
are part of our data analysis and vary in size which will give us a broad perspective of the 
mobile network operators. The infrastructure provider is one of the largest in the world 
and was chosen to provide us with insights from other parts of the mobile telecom 
industry value network. The analyst was chosen to supply us with information and 
analysis about the entirety of the mobile telecom industry. 
 
Our respondents were: 
• Andreas Constantinou, Managing Director, Vision Mobile (Analyst). Four 
phone interviews on March 8, 2013; March 21, 2013; April 11, 2013 and May 8, 
2013. 
• Jonas Selén, Director Business Development and Consumer Insights Group 
Function Sales & Marketing, Ericsson (Infrastructure provider). Interview in 
person on April 23, 2013.    
• Nils Rådström, Associate Director Strategy, Tele2 (Mobile network operator). 
Phone interview on April 29, 2013.   
• Svante Andersson, Group product manager for Mobile Broadband, TeliaSonera 
(Mobile network operator). Phone interview on May 3, 2013.   
• Arban Gashi, Retail Sales Manager, Chicago Market, AT&T (Mobile network 
operator). Phone interview on May 7, 2013. 
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All the interviews were performed through telephone, except one which was conducted in 
person, since it was difficult to meet the respondents in person due to distance and the 
availability of the respondents. Three of the interviews were performed in Swedish and 
translated to English by us after the interviews. We sent the questions to the respondents 
in advance so that they were able to reflect over their answers prior to the interview. The 
interviews were qualitative and conducted in a semi-structured manner to enable a 
flexible interview process (Bryman & Bell, 2005). The semi-structured interview 
approach enabled us to ask supplementary questions and follow up on interesting 
statements made by the respondents. 
 
2.3.2	  Analysis	  of	  interviews 
The interviews were recorded and the information gathered during the interviews was 
transcribed and summarized shortly after the interviews were held. The information was 
structured and categorized to facilitate the analysis of the material further on (Backman, 
2008). The respondents did receive the main questions in advance but we had also 
prepared some additional questions that the respondents were not aware of in advance. 
The semi-structured interview approach made it possible for us to receive the answers 
needed and obtain a broader perspective of the mobile telecom industry (Bryman & Bell, 
2005).  
 
The questions asked during the interviews were essentially similar, but some adjustments 
were made before each interview to customize the questions for the respondent. This 
customization was necessary to get the most out of the interviews since different parts of 
the mobile telecom industry were interviewed.  
 
The information gathered during the interviews is presented primarily in chapter 4 of this 
thesis where it is set in relation to literature and reports concerning the industry. 
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2.3.3	  Critique,	  reliability	  and	  validity 
We interviewed representatives from different parts of the mobile telecom value network, 
which gave us a broad view and increases the reliability and validity of the information 
collected from interviews since multiple perspectives are included. The respondents’ 
statements may be biased since they view the mobile telecom from a certain perspective, 
but we will supplement our interviews with other sources of information. However, it 
would have been desirable to interview a larger number of respondents in addition to the 
ones we interviewed. The interviews were transcribed and categorized shortly after the 
interviews were conducted. This decreases the risk for misinterpretations and increases 
the validity and reliability of the interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2005).  
 
The respondents received the main questions in advance and follow-up questions were 
asked to supplement the respondents’ answers during the interviews. A consequence of 
this semi-structured interview approach is that the content of the interviews will vary, but 
that is the intention of a semi-structured interview, to provide a flexible interview process 
(Bryman & Bell, 2005). A flexible interview process effects the reliability of the 
information since it will be difficult to gather the same information in another interview.  
 
Three of the interviews were conducted in Swedish and translated to English by us 
afterwards. Nuances may be lost as a consequence of the translation of the interviews, but 
since we are studying the content and not the nuances in the respondents’ answers that 
will not affect the quality of our interviews. 
 
2.4	  Gathering	  theory	  and	  information 
Theory and information about the mobile telecom has been gathered from various 
secondary sources – articles, industry reports, industry related web pages, textbooks, 
newspapers and scientific publications. These have been collected from Lund 
University’s web-based article search tool, libraries at Lund University, International 
Telecommunications Union, VisionMobile and Google search. 
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There are not many printed sources like textbooks or scientific publications available on 
mobile network operators since 2007 because it is recent history. However, industry 
reports, newspapers and industry related web pages have been able to provide us with 
accurate information on the industry. We have been critical to these sources, as well as all 
other sources, to avoid for example subjective opinions, speculations or groundless 
studies. Our aim has also has been to find as updated versions of sources as possible to 
increase the reliability and validity. In order to avoid misinterpretation, we have used 
original sources to the highest possible extent. Our sources as well as respondents have 
given us a consistent view of the development in the mobile telecom industry, which 
increases the reliability of this thesis.   
 
2.5	  Theoretical	  framework	  development 
Effects of disruptive innovations are often described generally or through examples, and 
by examining these descriptions we have been able to identify three major areas that 
disruptive innovation affects, as described in the background of this thesis. These areas 
are business models, value migration and value networks. Therefore we have developed 
our theoretical framework based on these three theoretical fields and theory on disruptive 
innovation. The theories have given us a broad view of potential effects of disruptive 
innovation, and have been used to identify factors that can be affected by disruptive 
innovation.  
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3.	  Theory 
 
The theory chapter presents four theoretical fields in accordance with what has been 
presented in the methodology chapter. It leads to a theoretical framework of factors that 
can be affected by disruptive innovation.  
	  	  	  
3.1	  Disruptive	  innovation 
According to Christensen (2013), disruptive innovations are products or services with 
business models that introduce performance packages that are inferior to what 
mainstream customers value. During the early development of a disruptive innovation it 
only serves niche segments. Both the disruptive innovation and the established offerings 
improve; nevertheless the disruptive innovation improves enough over time to satisfy the 
mainstream customers and eventually replaces the established offerings and incumbents 
that exceed the demanded performance, see Figure 2 (Christensen, 2013).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Disruptive innovation in accordance with definition by Christensen (2013). 
 
Eventually almost all products improve beyond the needs of the mainstream customers. 
This triggers a shift in the basis of competition to focus on price, flexibility, convenience 
or customization, and disruptive competitors start to replace established offerings 
(Christensen et al., 2001). Christensen & Raynor (2003) describes disruptive innovation 
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as a process rather than an event. Many disruptive innovations fail because they are part 
of a value network that cannot be adapted to support the disruption. 
 
Most waves of disruptive innovation are captured by others than the earlier leaders of an 
industry (Christensen, 2013). One example is the computer industry, where IBM 
dominated the mainframe computer market, but missed the emergence of minicomputers 
by years (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). The mainframe computers were available to a 
few experts at universities only, but minicomputers made the technology available to a 
much larger population. The minicomputers have been preceded by desktops, then 
laptops and now smartphones. One reason is that leading companies listen too carefully 
to their customers, so they miss the emergence of innovation that is not valued by their 
customers initially. However, there are also exceptions when leading companies manage 
to stay on top (Christensen & Raynor, 2003).  
 
The concept of disruptive innovation has been broadened by a number of authors and 
there is a debate on what exactly can be defined as disruptive innovation. Many authors 
classify and use disruptive innovation in a broader sense (Danneels, 2004; Dan & Chieh, 
2008). Christensen (2006) recognizes that disruptive innovation has been improved by 
other authors and sees the building of theory on disruptive innovation as an ongoing 
process.  
 
Christensen & Raynor (2003) divides disruptive innovation into low-end and new-market 
disruption. New-market disruptive innovation creates a new value network, i.e. expands 
the market to new customers. Low-end disruption on the other hand, target the most over 
served and least-profitable customers at the low end of the original value network. 
Markides (2006) agrees that disruptive innovation can enlarge the industry, by attracting 
new customers and making existing customers consume more. Furthermore, he states that 
disruptive innovation can significantly change customers’ behaviors and habits.  
 
Govindarajan & Kopalle (2006) on the other hand, refers to high-end and low-end 
disruptive innovation. High-end disruptive innovation is disruptive innovation with a 
higher-per unit margin than established offerings, but with different performance features 
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that mainstream customers do not value at the time of introduction, so it serves a small 
niche before it disrupts the market. 
 
3.2	  Value	  migration 
3.2.1	  Life	  cycles	  of	  business	  designs	   
According to Slywotzky (1996) business designs go through life cycles, from growth to 
economic obsolescence. Value migration occurs when value moves from outdated 
business designs to new ones that better satisfy the customers’ priorities. The driving 
force of value migration is the changing pattern in what customers want, need and are 
willing to pay for. 
 
Slywotzky & Baumgarter (2006) defines the term business design as the blueprint of the 
way a company does business. For example how a company selects its customers, what 
value proposition it offers, which profit model it uses, which activities it engages in, what 
strategy it uses to capture profits and which organizational architecture it uses to 
implement decisions. 
 
Three phases of value migration can be identified; these are the value inflow, value 
stability and value outflow phase, see Figure 3 below (Slywotzky, 1996). The phases 
describe how well a business designs can create value, which matches customers’ 
priorities in relation to its competitors, and as a result generate high returns. The model 
can be used to describe value migration within a company, between companies and 
between industries. 
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Figure 3: The three phases of value migration in accordance with Slywotzky (1996). 
                                                                     
The value inflow phase provides several opportunities to abstract value from a 
surrounding with high growth, limited competition and profitability (Slywotzky, 1996). 
Value can be absorbed from other parts of for example an industry if the business design 
is superior in meeting customers’ priorities. A shift in value migration can be initiated 
when a company employs a new business design, which responds to customer priorities 
that established competitors have failed to see or neglected. Companies with business 
designs in the value inflow phase are often characterized by excitement, confidence and a 
capability to attract top talent.  
  
In the second phase, value stability, business designs match customer priorities well and a 
competitive balance predominates the market (Slywotzky, 1996). Companies can grow 
by continuing to serve customer’s priorities and improving operational efficiencies, but 
only at a low or moderate pace. Market shares and margins remain steady. Focus is on 
improving activities that have led to success in the past.       
                                           
In the final phase, value outflow, the competition is intensifying, the opportunities to 
abstract value are decreasing and profits decline (Slywotzky, 1996). Value migrates from 
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obsolete business designs to new ones, which are better able to satisfy customers’ 
evolving priorities. Moreover, in-bound talent, customers and resources leave at an 
accelerating rate. In the value outflow phase, focus should be on redesigning obsolete 
parts of a business design. 
       
The length of the phases varies depending on at which rate new business designs that 
better respond to the customer priorities emerges (Slywotzky, 1996). However, shorter 
product life cycles, international competition and well-informed customers have made the 
phases shorter. A company can only exist in one phase at the time, and only move from 
value outflow to value stability, or from value stability to value inflow, if it applies a new 
business design. 
 
Performance is generally demanded early in business designs life cycles (Slywotzky, 
1996). However, as products or services mature and competitors match the performance, 
the consumers’ priorities often shift to cost-efficiency as long as the business designs 
remain the same. The reason is that what was initially new is regarded as something that 
all products or services must have at a later phase, i.e. commoditization. 
 
3.2.2	  Transition	  of	  phases	  	   
Business design phase transitions are typically subtle with no sharp transition points, so 
managements can easily miss them (Slywotzky, 1996). Managers have tendencies to 
dismiss downturns as seasonal effects or special circumstances. The above-mentioned 
limitations can lead to unexpected collapses of companies that have not adapted their 
objectives in line with the business design life cycle. Furthermore, value can migrate 
towards several new types of business designs simultaneously and it is even harder to be 
prepared for. Flexible organizations with an ability to detect early signals of transitions 
and adapt to them, have better preconditions of handling transitions.  
    
As mentioned, transitions normally occur when new business designs, which better meet 
customer priorities, become available and customers’ priorities change (Slywotzky, 
1996). However, unexpected external shocks can also trigger business design phase 
transitions. For example trade restrictions, aggressive pricing, war, regulations and 
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innovation can result in value migration from one business design to another. Companies 
can sometimes reduce the damage or even benefit from these external events if they 
understand them at an early stage. 
 
3.2.3	  Bargaining	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  value	  migration 
Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) argues that the realization of value is determined by the 
bargaining relationships between the sellers and buyers. For instance, the level of 
differentiation, switching costs, presence of substitutes, strength of distribution channels 
and supplier competition can determine a supplier’s bargaining power (Porter, 2008), 
which in turn decides its ability to capture value (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). Cox 
(2001) comes to the same conclusion, i.e. that value migrates in the direction of power. If 
the buyer is dominant, the seller has few alternatives for its services and products, thus 
the value flows to the buyer.     
                                                                        
3.3	  Business	  models	  
3.3.1	  Introducing	  the	  concept 
There are diverse definitions and interpretations of the concept of a business model, and it 
is often used vaguely to describe how companies are organized to generate profits 
(Porter, 2001). Magretta (2002) describes that a business model should identify 
customers, what they value and how the company should make profit from delivering this 
value. Amit & Zott (2001) argue that a business model represents in what way a company 
makes transactions possible that benefit participants like customers, suppliers and 
partners.  
 
3.3.2	  Creating	  and	  delivering	  value 
Johnson et al. (2008b) states that many companies do not understand their own business 
model because of the lack of definition. To solve this problem, a business model can be 
divided into four interlocking elements that in combination both create and deliver value. 
These are the customer value proposition, profit formula, key resources and key 
processes. 
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The most important element is the customer value proposition, the sum of total benefits 
offered in return for a payment, because a company can only be successful as long as it 
creates value for its customers (Johnson et al., 2008b). The profit formula is the blueprint 
of how a company creates value for itself; it consists of cost structure, revenue model, 
margin model and resource velocity (Johnson et al., 2008b). 
 
Key resources are assets that are crucial when delivering value, for example products, 
employees, brands, information, technology, partnerships and equipment. Key processes 
on the other hand, are the operational and managerial processes that allow companies to 
deliver value, such as manufacturing, budgeting, planning, service and sales (Johnson et 
al., 2008b). 
 
3.3.3	  Changing	  business	  models 
Many companies make substantial efforts to innovate on their products, but it is often 
expensive, time-consuming, requires large investments and returns are uncertain (Amit & 
Zott, 2012). Business models often go unchallenged for a long time, but more and more 
companies are turning towards business model innovation as a way to create new value. 
This could be done by adding new activities, linking activities in novel ways or changing 
who that performs an activity. Business model value drivers can also be identified, for 
example novelty, lock-in, complementarities and efficiency (Amit & Zott, 2012).   
 
3.4	  Value	  Network	   
3.4.1	  Definition 
Porter (1985) models a value chain as series of activities, within and around an 
organization, which creates a service or product for the market. There are primary 
activities like operations, logistics and sales, and support activities such as technology 
development and human resource management. However, a single organization rarely 
undertakes all these activities in-house. Therefore the term value network is used to 
describe a number of value chains that work together in an interconnected system, from 
raw material or design to delivery of a final product or service (Johnson et al., 2008a). 
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Christensen & Raynor (2003) describes a value network as a collection of suppliers and 
channel partners that collaborate to respond to the needs of customers.  
 
3.4.2	  Characteristics	  of	  value	  networks	   
Value-adding activities and costs occur in many parts of a value network, for example in 
the distribution and supply chains (Johnson et al., 2008a). Thus firms need to understand 
the entire the value network to improve the value that customers receive. Different levels 
of profits are available to different parts of a value network, depending on the 
competitive intensity. Firms are faced with decisions to do activates in-house or 
outsource, and should consider issues like cost-advantages and control over key strategic 
processes (Johnson et al., 2008a). The more a firm outsources, the more important the 
ability to influence other parts of the value network becomes.  
 
As resources become more dematerialized, such as information and capital, the 
traditional view of value chains and value networks becomes obsolete, because value 
structures can take other forms and change fast (Normann, 2001). This means that parts 
of the value network can be demolished unexpectedly. Then it is no longer about who can 
position itself best in the value network, but rather who can find the most creative ways 
to create value. Many value networks have become more complex than ever, which has 
made disruption from unexpected players more common (Sargut & McGrath, 2011). 
Furthermore, complementors are firms that provide products or services that increase the 
value of each other’s offerings in the customers’ eyes (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006). The 
demand for one product can increase if the price or quality for the complement is 
improved. 
 
3.5	  Theoretical	  framework	   
We have developed our theoretical framework by examining theory on disruptive 
innovation, value migration, value networks and business models, see Table 1. In each 
theoretical field we have searched for potential factors that can be affected by disruptive 
innovation. Some of these factors belong to more than one of the theoretical fields, 
however we have placed them in the field were they are mainly discussed. The factors 
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have been examined in our analysis to see to what degree they comply with our case 
study.  
 
The theoretical fields used in the theoretical framework are highly interconnected 
concepts, but our aim has been to make the factors as independent as possible. However 
some degree of overlapping has not been possible to avoid. Some of the theory referred to 
in the theoretical framework merely defines concepts and have not been used in the 
analysis. The purposes of those references are simply to orientate.   
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Theoretical 
fields 
Factors  Theoretical description of factors References 
Disruptive 
innovation 
Basis of competition The basis of competition can change to price, 
flexibility, convenience or customization. 
Christensen, 2001 
Market shares Disruptive innovation can eventually replace 
established offerings and incumbents.  
Christensen, 2013; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 
2006 
Market size The industry can be enlarged when new 
customers are attracted and existing customers 
consume more.  
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Markides, 
2006 
Customer behavior The customers’ behaviors and habits can 
significantly change. 
Dan & Chieh, 2008; Danneels, 2004; 
Christensen, 2006; Markides, 2006; 
Slywotzky, 1996  
Value 
migration 
 
Value migration 
within a company 
Value can move from outdated business designs 
to new ones within a company that better satisfy 
the customers’ priorities.  
Christensen, 2013; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2001; 
Slywotzky, 1996; Slywotzky & 
Baumgarter, 2006 
Value migration 
between companies 
Value can move from outdated business designs 
to new ones in other companies that better satisfy 
the customers’ priorities. 
Christensen, 2013; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2001; 
Slywotzky, 1996; Slywotzky & 
Baumgarter, 2006 
Value migration 
between industries 
Value can move from outdated business designs 
to new ones in other industries that better satisfy 
the customers’ priorities. 
Christensen, 2013; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003; Christensen et al., 2001; 
Slywotzky, 1996; Slywotzky & 
Baumgarter, 2006 
Bargaining power  Bargaining power of relationships between firms 
can change. 
Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Cox, 
2001; Porter, 2008 
Business 
models  
 
Customer value 
proposition 
Value proposition, the sum of total benefits 
offered in in return for a payment, can change.  
 
Amit & Zott, 2001; Amit & Zott, 2012; 
Johnson et al., 2008b; Markides, 2006; 
Margretta, 2002; Porter, 2001; 
Slywotzky, 1996; Slywotzky & 
Baumgarter, 2006 
Profit formula Profit formula, the blueprint of how a company 
creates value for itself, can change. 
Amit & Zott, 2001; Amit & Zott, 2012; 
Johnson et al., 2008b; Margretta, 2002; 
Porter, 2001; Slywotzky, 1996; 
Slywotzky & Baumgarter, 2006 
Key resources Key resources, the assets that are crucial when 
delivering value, can change.  
Amit & Zott, 2001; Amit & Zott, 2012; 
Johnson et al., 2008b; Margretta, 2002; 
Porter, 2001; Slywotzky, 1996; 
Slywotzky & Baumgarter, 2006 
Key processes Key processes, the operational and managerial 
processes that allow companies to deliver value, 
can change.  
Amit & Zott, 2001; Amit & Zott, 2012; 
Johnson et al., 2008b; Margretta, 2002; 
Porter, 2001; Slywotzky, 1996; 
Slywotzky & Baumgarter, 2006 
Value 
network 
 
Value network 
structures  
The value network structures, how the value-
adding activities are linked, can change.  
 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Johnson et 
al., 2008a; Normann, 2001; Porter, 
1985; Sargut & McGrath, 2011; Yoffie 
& Kwak, 2006 
 
Table 1: The theoretical framework of this thesis.  
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4.	  Mobile	  network	  operators	  development	  
 
In the fourth chapter the development of mobile network operators is presented with a 
focus on the time period from 2007 until today. The headings are based on the factors in 
the theoretical framework to provide a clear view of how the mobile network operators 
have changed.  
  
 
4.1	  Basis	  of	  competition 
The change from mobile telephony to mobile computing has transformed the basis of 
competition within the mobile telecom industry from reliability and scale of networks, to 
an environment where choice and flexibility is more valued by end-users (VisionMobile, 
2012a). 
 
A number of new players have been introduced in the mobile telecom industry such as 
platforms and OTT players. This has resulted in that the industry has become more 
competitive as well as more innovative according to GSMA (2013). Constantinou 
(interview, April 11, 2013) brings up the emergence of apps and says that the innovation 
in the mobile telecom industry is not inside the industry and the basis of competition is 
now the diversity and the number of applications that exist. “It is no longer whether your 
voice calls are good enough or if the data connection is good enough, the user does not 
care about that anymore. The value is having the right applications or the applications 
that you are interested in on your phone”. Greenwich Consulting (2011) confirms that 
new business ideas and services are mainly coming from the “Internet” by OTT players.   
 
The change in the basis of competition has caused new business models within mobile 
telecom to go from proven and predictable to new and unpredictable (VisionMobile, 
2012b), and it has put pressure on the mobile network operators (VisionMobile, 2012a). 
 
4.2	  Market	  shares 
Mobile network operator portals, which completely dominated content distribution for 
mobile telecom before 2007, have decreased in importance compared to app stores 
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(VisionMobile, 2011). In March 2013, the mobile network operator portals only 
accounted for 6 % of the content downloads on mobile phones worldwide, while app 
stores accounted for the remaining 94 % (Juniper Research, 2013). 
 
Table 1 illustrates the mobile telecom value network and the parties’ percentage of the 
total revenue in the value network, which gives an understanding of the size of different 
players. The mobile network operators are the largest party in the value network and the 
platforms and OTT players are the smallest party. However, the platforms and OTT 
players have increased from almost 0.1 % of the total market in 2008 to 4 % in 2011 
(Sharma, 2009; Sharma, 2012b). 
Year 
 
Infrastructure 
providers 
Mobile network 
operators 
Handset 
OEMs 
Platforms and 
OTT players 
Total market 
 
2011 7% 74% 15% 4% USD 1.4 trillion 
2008 5% 77% 18% 0.1% USD 1.1 trillion 
 
Table 2: The global mobile telecom value network divided by revenue (Sharma, 2009; Sharma, 2012b). 
 
4.3	  Market	  size	   
There have been a number of changes in sizes of different markets within the mobile 
telecom industry. Content revenue for mobile phones has grown rapidly during the last 
couple of years, driven by the increased usage of apps (Juniper Research, 2013). When it 
comes to mobile subscriptions, the growth is now in the developing countries. The 
growth in the developing countries is driven by the increased penetration rates of 
smartphones, while the growth in the developed countries is powered by both increased 
penetration rates of smartphones and the increased speeds of data access (GSMA, 2013). 
 
Figure 4 and Appendix 1 shows the number of mobile subscriptions in the developed and 
developing countries, and the total number of mobile subscriptions in the world. The 
number of mobile subscriptions in the developed countries has increased slightly between 
2007-2011, while the number of mobile subscriptions in the developing countries has 
almost doubled during the same time period. 
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Figure 4: The mobile subscriptions in the world, developed and developing countries based on data from 
ITU (2013). 
 
The 5,962 million mobile subscriptions does not represent 5,962 unique end-users since 
this count reflects the number of SIM-cards and thereby also reflect end-users with 
multiple mobile subscriptions. There are 4 billion unique end-users and 48 % (1.9 billion) 
of them have more than one mobile subscription, which means that they have more than 
one SIM-card (Ahonen, 2012).  
 
In the developing countries there are some parts of the population where mobile 
subscriptions are rare and shared within families or sometimes villages (Ahonen, 2012). 
Ahonen estimates that 200 million of the people in the developing countries share a 
phone, and since the shared usage is not accounted for in the statistics over unique users 
the total number of unique users with an owned or shared phone is 4.2 billion. 
 
Figure 5 and Appendix 2 shows the mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, the 
subscriber penetration rate, for the developed and developing countries, and the total 
mobile subscriber penetration rate for the world. Between 2007 and 2011 the mobile 
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subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the developed countries increased from 102 to 119, 
which shows that there on average was 1.19 mobile subscriptions per inhabitant in 2011. 
In the developing countries the mobile subscriber penetration rate rose from 39.1 % to 
78.9 % between the years 2007-2011. This displays that the mobile penetrations rate 
nearly doubled during that time period and that there is almost 80 mobile subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants in the developing countries. 
 
 
Figure 5: The mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the world, developed and developing countries 
based on data from ITU (2013). 
 
4.4	  Customer	  behavior 
There have been some changes in how customers, in this case end-users, consume and 
use mobile phones. End-users’ mobile telecom habits do no longer only involve 
traditional voice and message services, but also a number of other areas like utilities, 
health and education. Many people cannot imagine life before the smartphone. The 
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average mobile data access speed has doubled between 2010 and 2012 and the increasing 
speed of mobile data access allows the end-users to consume more data (GSMA, 2013). 
 
Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013) argues that the choice of phone is more 
important today, rather than the choice of mobile network operator. Referring to mobile 
network operators he says: “Maybe one has a better customer experience or whatever, but 
it is a small difference. Whether a consumer buys voice from one telco or another does 
not make a difference, and the average user will not pay more for high quality voice”. 
Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) argues that the most important purchase decision 
for an end-user today normally is which mobile phone to choose, rather than which 
mobile network operator.  
 
Gashi (interview, May 7, 2013) says that the mobile telecom industry was more of a sales 
environment before the smartphones were launched, were customers would walk into 
stores not knowing which phone to buy and get advice in the store. Now the consumers 
are the smartest they have even been and most of the time they already know what they 
want when they walk into the stores. 
 
The annual smartphone sales worldwide have gone from approximately 11 % of the 
mobile phone market in 2007 to an estimated 51 % in 2013, see Figure 6. However, the 
penetration is significantly higher in developed countries compared to developing 
countries, where less people can afford the smartphones (Cocotas, A., 2013). 
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Figure 6: Annual sale of mobile phones worldwide, sales numbers and forecast based on Cocotas, A. 
(2013). 
 
4.5	  Value	  migration	  within	  a	  company 
Voice services had been the main source of revenue for almost all the mobile network 
operators in the preceding 30 years, but in 2013 voice revenues are expected to fall below 
60 % of the total revenues (Sharma, 2012a). The declining revenues for voice services 
has this far been counterbalanced by increasing revenues for data access and messaging, 
but some operators have recently begun to experience decreasing revenues for messaging 
services. 
 
According to Sharma (2012a) there are various revenue growth curves, and in order to 
understand them the mobile subscription growth should be correlated with the operators’ 
revenues. The operators’ revenues should be divided into the segments voice, messaging 
and data access, and when the subscriber penetration for a specific segment advance 
towards 70-90 % penetration the segment revenue reaches its peak. The revenues for the 
specific segment increase slowly when the subscriber penetration is beneath 25 %, and 
after that the revenue growth accelerates until it reaches its peak at 70-90 % subscriber 
penetration where the revenue growth stagnates and starts to decline (Sharma, 2012a). 
The revenue growth curves can be observed in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7: The revenue growth curves for voice, messaging, data access and VAS/OTT in accordance with 
Sharma (2012a). 
 
The revenue growth curve for voice, the first curve, is declining for most of the 
developed countries and the revenue growth curve for messaging, the second curve, has 
started to decline for some developed countries as well (Sharma, 2012a). These two 
revenue growth curves are still rising in the developing countries where the mobile 
subscriber penetration is increasing rapidly. The revenue growth curve for data access, 
the third curve, is currently rising for both developed and developing countries and 
Sharma (2012a) expects this growth to continue for the next 3-4 years. In addition to the 
previously mentioned curves there is also a fourth curve which represents the revenue 
growth for value added services, VAS, and over-the-top services, OTTs. The fourth curve 
is made up by several new application and service areas, some which are not even though 
of yet. According to Sharma (2012a) the mobile network operators’ investments and 
strategies, mainly concerning the fourth revenue curve, will be critical for their future 
existence. Sharma (2012a, p19) also argues that “Mobile operators must look at ways to 
move beyond just providing access services and position themselves from being service 
providers to becoming service innovators”.  
 
Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) describes how the pricing has changed from 2007 
until today, when the prices of services were based on the number of services, messages 
and minutes to a greater extent. Today the pricing in the industry is more about bundling 
the services and pricing the whole package, so called “Bucket pricing”. It is hard to 
specify how much profit voice, message and data access generates since it is more of a 
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theoretical question and a question of allocation since they are not selling pure voice, 
message or data packages. 
 
Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) also explains that the pricing in the industry has 
developed towards the selling of packages, “buckets”. According to him they naturally 
view the profit margins for each product in the package, but it is important to be aware of 
that it is a utilization of overhead costs since most of nods and components in the 
networks are not specific for one product. 
 
4.6	  Value	  migration	  between	  companies 
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) explains that the mobile telecom industry has some 
characteristics that differ from other industries since it demands infrastructure and 
licenses that require large investments. The mobile network operators have to purchase 
licenses to access specific radio spectrums, and this varies in different countries. Thus, 
mobile network operators are limited to offer mobile telecom services in countries were 
they have licenses, which means that many of these mobile network operators do not 
compete with each other straightforward.  
 
To examine if value has migrated between mobile network operators 12 companies were 
studied to see how their profit margins, EBITDA margins and ARPU has changed among 
the companies between 2007 and 2011.  
 
Profit margin in the companies’ net income divided by revenue and is a measure of 
profitability. The companies’ profit margins are presented in Appendix 3 and the result 
has also been presented with graphs below in Figure 8. When the profit margins are 
examined they show that there are large fluctuations to be found for many of the mobile 
network operators. Tele2 has for example gone from having a negative profit margin (-
0.2%) to 12 % in 2011. Telenor on the other hand has decreased its profit margin from 
20.8% in 2007 down to 7.3% in 2011. 
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Figure 8: The observed mobile network operators’ profit margins based on data from the companies’ 
annual reports 2007-2011. 
 
The EBITDA margin is the companies’ earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by the revenue, and is also a measure of profitability used to 
compare different companies. When the individual companies EBITDA margins are 
studied (see Appendix 4 and Figure 9) some fluctuations can be found but for most have 
remained a rather stable EBITDA margin through the observed period.   
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Figure 9: EBITDA margins for the observed companies based on data from the companies’ annual reports 
2007-2011. 
 
The average revenue per unit, APRU, is calculated as revenue divided by the number of 
subscriptions. This measure is used to provide a view of how much revenue each 
subscriber accounts for. The changes of ARPU have been measured year-by-year 
between 2008 and 2011 as a percentage and are shown in Figure 10 and Appendix 5. 
2007 has not been included in the analysis of ARPU since the year-by-year development 
has been measured. The ARPU has constantly declined for most of the observed mobile 
network operators during the observed time period. This can according to GSMA (2013) 
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be explained by the continued prices declines for mobile network operators since the 
growth in revenues is slower than the growth in the number of subscriptions.  
 
 
Figure 10: The percentage change per year of ARPU for the observed companies, based on data from the 
companies’ annual reports 2007-2011. 
 
4.7	  Value	  migration	  between	  industries 
According to Sharma (2012a) the most interesting aspect regarding the previously 
mentioned fourth revenue curve is that the mobile network operators are competing with 
new service and application providers in addition to the other mobile network operators. 
 
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) states that the problems that the mobile network 
operators are facing today is a result of the high profitability they have previously 
rendered on their traditional services. This is a question of incentives, since the incentives 
for change are low and the barriers for innovation and new thinking are high when you 
have a business which is that established. 
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The emergence of app stores has affected the mobile network operators in positive and 
negative terms. Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) explains that one positive aspect of 
this development is that “The traffic through out networks increase and that is great since 
it is a way for us as an mobile network operators to make more money”. One negative 
aspect he states is that a larger number of parties is providing the similar communication 
services. 
 
According to Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013) ”Value is migration of out the 
mobile network operators, and for very good reasons since users are not willing to pay 
more for voice and for messaging”. He says that the main problem is the same for all the 
mobile network operators, and that is the fact that they have a traditional business, which 
is voice and messaging that has been challenged. Those services have been challenged 
because people have found out that there are other ways to communicate besides 
traditional voice and messaging, the users can now use OTT services as for example 
Whatsapp and Viber to communicate through voice and message (Constantinou, 
interview, March 21, 2013). Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) believes that it is the 
messaging business that mobile network operators will loose first, because of Apple 
iMessage, Whatsapp and other messaging apps provided by the OTT players.  
 
The mobile network operators are no longer in charge of distributing the services since 
that has shifted to the platform companies, which are the new distributers of services 
(Constantinou, interview, March 21, 2013). “The telcos are the collateral damage to the 
so-called OTT players, because the OTT players, for example Viber and Whatsapp, need 
the network but to them it provides no differentiation whether it is Wifi or 3G, it makes 
no difference to them”. So the main problems and threats for the mobile network 
operators are to reverse the decline of services revenue, in terms of average revenue per 
user. 
 
The average profit margin, EBITDA margin and average change in ARPU for a sample 
of mobile network operators have been studied to determine how the mobile network 
operators are performing as an industry. Since 12 mobile network operators were studied 
this analysis may not be completely representative for the industry, but it can still be used 
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as an indicator of the mobile network operators’ performance and profitability. 
 
The average profit margin for the observed mobile network operators has remained rather 
stable during 2007 through 2011, see Table 3. It has fluctuated slightly, but overall the 
studied mobile network operators have remained an average between 11% and 14 %.  
 
 
Table 3: The average profit margin for the observed companies based on data from the companies annual 
reports 2007-2011. 
 
The average EBITDA margin (Table 4) for the observed mobile network operators has 
been solid during 2007 to 2011 and only varied 1 percentage. EBITDA is used to 
compare and study profitability between companies and industries since it removes some 
effects of financing and accounting decisions and is used to provide a “clearer view” of 
the profitability (Koller et al, 2010). EBITDA is basically net income were interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization has been added back. In this analysis the average EBITDA 
margin has varied less than the profit margin which indicates that the mobile network 
operators may have made changes concerning their interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization. 
 
 
Table 4: The Average EBITDA margin for the observed companies based on data from the companies 
annual reports 2007-2011. 
  
The overall Average Revenue per unit, ARPU, for the 12 observed mobile network 
operators have constantly declined from 2008 to 2011 (see Table 5). 2007 has not been 
included in the analysis of ARPU since the year-by-year development has been 
measured. The revenues for the studied mobile network operators have increased during 
the period, but the number of subscriptions has grown at a higher rate which has caused 
the ARPU to decline.  
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Average.Profit.Margin 12% 12% 13% 14% 11%
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Average.EBITDA.Margin 35% 35% 36% 36% 35%
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Table 5: The average change of ARPU per year for the observed companies based on data from the 
companies’ annual reports 2007-2011. 
 
4.8	  Bargaining	  power	   
Handset OEMs and mobile network operators each try to increase their power in the 
smartphone market. Handset OEMs can accomplish this partially by building brand 
images towards customers. The iPhone is an excellent recent example this, and it has 
made it possible for Apple to pressure mobile network operators to subsidize their 
phones. Also by adding complementary assets like the app stores, Handset OEMs and 
platforms have created customer lock-in effects, thus increased their influence (Dedrick 
et al., 2011). 
 
Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) states: “If we look back at 2007, then most mobile 
network operators had more to say, if one is to be honest”. He explains that in 2007 all 
the handset OEMs wanted the mobile network operators to embrace their products to 
such a degree, that they did not mind if the mobile network operators branded the mobile 
phones. Today there is not much branding of phones. He argues that the reason why there 
has been a shift in the power is that there has been a lot of innovation, especially when it 
comes to mobile phones and services. In that aspect the competition has increased, not 
among the mobile network operators, but a larger number of parties are competing for the 
end-user’s attention now compared to 2007. Some handset OEMs, especially Apple, can 
be a lot tougher in their negotiations with the mobile network operators today (Rådström, 
interview, April 29, 2013). The relation between Apple and some handset OEMs is tense, 
for example Apple can pressure the mobile network operators to allocate resources to 
promote the handset OEMs’ products. Shaughnessy (2013) confirms that Apple insist on 
that mobile network operators must keep certain sales targets, which can be hard for 
smaller network operators to handle. 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011
Average-%-change-of-ARPU-per-year !2% !3% !2% !1%
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Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) describes that there has been a consolidation in of 
the infrastructure providers to a few companies, which he believes is positive from a 
mobile network operator perspective. Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) states that 
many infrastructure providers have been put under a lot of price pressure from mobile 
network operators. He says that “Without this pressure, the development on the cost side 
of mobile network operators would be completely different.” When Selén (interview, 
April 23, 2013) argues: “The mobile network operators have been able to pressure the 
infrastructure providers prices a lot and keep the gains to themselves”. 
 
4.9	  Customer	  value	  proposition	   
The business models for mobile network operators were quite distinct before 2007, for 
example the purpose and functionality of offerings were well understood. When it came 
to voice, the goal for mobile network operators was to connect people though voice calls, 
and provide the best quality at the lowest cost. Similarly, messaging was about delivering 
messages from one node to another and data access was about connecting a mobile phone 
to a network and to provide the fastest speed at a minimum cost (Sharma, 2012a).  
 
Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013) explains that mobile network operators are still 
mainly addressing communication needs like voice, messaging and data access; however, 
it is only one part of the end-users mobile phone needs today. Mobile telecom has in the 
past few years become connected with a wide range of areas through OTT players, for 
example utilities, health, education and financial transactions. Mobile network operators 
are trying to take part of these areas (GSMA, 2013).  
 
Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013) explains that the mobile network operators are 
attempting to make new deals with OTT players. Constantinou (interview, April 11, 
2013) states that “If you think in technology terms there is no way to figure out how you 
can add value, because technology does not add value.” The mobile network operators 
should think about how they add value to end-users since “Value is no longer in 
providing telephony and messaging, because value has migrated to other parts of the 
value network. This is what telcos need to realize, because unless you are adding value in 
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areas where values is migrating you cannot extract value /…/ you can only extract value 
by adding value”. 
 
Prior to 2007 most customers paid for voice and messaging per unit of use, i.e. per 
minute or per message (Sharma, 2012a). In the early stages of the smartphone era many 
mobile network operators initially provided unlimited data access to boost demand, but 
this could not the sustained as demand rose. Unlimited voice and messaging can on the 
other hand be sustained, since they do not burden the mobile networks as much. Mobile 
network operators are increasingly offering integrated price plans that bundle voice, 
messaging and data access into one package (Salz, 2011). 
 
The mobile network operators voice calls generally offer better quality than the voice 
apps (VisionMobile, 2012c). The voice apps do on the other hand enable new features 
that the mobile network operators’ voice does not offer, for example calling any type of 
device, like a computer or tablet. Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) on the other hand, 
argues that the voice apps primarily are a substitute for the roaming and that they mainly 
are in competition for international calls. 
 
4.10	  Profit	  formula	   
Before 2007 it was rather clear to the mobile network operators what investments were 
required and the expected returns (Sharma, 2012a). Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) 
states that “When iPhone was launched in 2007, it enabled the mobile network operators 
to start selling a lot of data access, as it created an ecosystem with a great customer 
experience”. However, wireless networks alone cannot guarantee profitable growth for 
mobile network operators (VisionMobile, 2012a). Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) says 
“Since the mobile network operators have had high profitability on traditional services 
for a long time, the barriers for them to think differently are high, and the incitement to 
change is low.” Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013) explains that all the mobile 
network operators are worried about how they are going to compete in the future and says 
that “The technologies themselves does not generate revenue, this it what telcos currently 
think, and this is why they are too slow to understand how they should react”, telcos 
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referring to the mobile network operators. Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) also states 
that “There are no revolutions in the mobile telecom industry, only transitions that take 
time since everything is standardized and regulated”.  
 
VisionMobile (2012a) visualizes the mobile network operators by three layers: 
1. Connectivity – data access 
2. Services – telephony, messaging, portals and other value-adding services 
3. Distribution – physical and digital retail, customer care, consumer intelligence 
and more 
 
These have all been impacted differently by the disruptive innovation (VisionMobile, 
2012a). Connectivity has grown rapidly because of the demand to connect the 
smartphones and apps to the Internet. Services on the other hand have been affected by a 
flood of innovative OTT alternatives which have cut into telephony and messaging 
revenues. OTT players can do this with very small budgets in mobile network operators’ 
terms. They have also made the mobile network operators’ portals outdated. Distribution 
on the other hand, is mainly seen as a cost center. 
 
Many mobile network operators initially blocked apps that compete with voice or 
messaging, or deprioritized them in the mobile networks to undermine the quality (Salz, 
2011). However, more and more bundled package price plans are sold now to make it 
difficult for customer to reduce what they spend on voice, messaging and data access 
individually, and it makes the OTT players less relevant. Selén (interview, April 23, 
2013) states that the purpose for the mobile network operators’ bundling of the prices is 
to “conquer the OTT players because bundling removes the cost benefit of using for 
example the OTT players voice services instead of mobile network operators’ voice 
service”. According to Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) the mobile network 
operators’ response to the increasing competition from companies that offer their 
communication services for free, the OTT players, have been to try to bundle the pricing. 
Mobile network operators are also fighting OTT players by launching voice and 
messaging apps of their own (Sharma, 2012b).  
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Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) explains that service providers have traditionally had to 
pay the mobile network operators to distribute services through mobile phones, in a 
similar way that platforms now charge for services to be in app stores. The app stores 
have resulted in that mobile telecom operators compete with a number of new business 
models (Sharma, 2012a). For example, when it comes to mobile payments and 
commerce, the mobile network operators are now forced to compete fiercely over 
customers. However, Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) believes that mobile network 
operators may have an advantage when it comes to mobile payments, since they already 
have a billing relation with customers and are often ranked high when you ask customers 
whom they trust. 
 
4.11	  Key	  resources	   
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) explains that the mobile network operators have certain 
characteristics when it comes to resources. They rely on enormous infrastructure of 
mobile networks and have licenses to access specific radio spectrums. Only certain radio 
spectrums are used for mobile network operators, which are regulated by governments in 
different countries. Some governments sell licenses for large amounts or force mobile 
network operators to provide coverage even in commercially less viable areas. Thus 
licenses are rare resources and in combination with high capital expenditure on 
infrastructure investments, it is very hard for new mobile network operators to enter the 
market (Selén, interview, April 23, 2013). 
 
The content of apps stores have gradually replaced some of mobile network operators’ 
key assets like user identification, location, billing and authentication (VisionMobile, 
2012a). If the mobile network operators loose too much interaction with end-users they 
will lose the ability to differentiate, and consequently run the risk that their services will 
become commodities. 
 
Gashi (interview, May 7, 2013) says that the key resources for mobile network operators 
today are the employees, since they are the front line of the business and the ones who 
meet the customers. Constantinou (interview, May 8, 2013) argue that mobile network 
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operators are “Not very attractive to work for today, so top talent is flocking away from 
telcos, not into telcos. In fact, it is also one of the least attractive businesses for 
investors”. Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) says: ”Mobile network operators have 
always been quite attractive to work for, but in the past we have attracted more 
employees from the universities. Nowadays it is more OTT-players such as Google and 
Spotify that score high on graduates ranking lists of potential employers.” 
 
4.12	  Key	  processes	   
Constantinou (interview, Mars 21, 2013) argues that while software business models 
have changed spectacularly since 2007, the mobile telecom operators’ business models 
have in comparison only had minor changes. Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) agrees that 
mobile network operators have not changed their business models much since 2007.  
 
Constantinou (interview, Mars 21, 2013) argues that one reason is that mobile network 
operators find it hard to is change processes due to culture and legacy thinking, they are 
very slow-moving organizations. He argues that mobile network operators have been 
trying to hire people from other industries than telecom, but still find it hard to change 
processes. He says that “I would not say that the introduction of smartphones has caused 
a major change in telcos organizational processes. Billing, distribution, CRM and more 
have all seen incremental changes”. Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) cannot either 
identify any major changes within the mobile network operators processes due to 
smartphones.   
 
4.13	  Value	  network	  structures 
There has been a shift in mobile telecom to move from mobile network operators as 
center of service distribution to the platforms as center of service distribution, due to the 
change of the basis of competition (VisionMobile, 2012a; Constantinou, interview, April 
11, 2013). The mobile telecom value network in 2007 was integrated, closed for outsiders 
and controlled by mobile network operators, and they distributed services through their 
portals (VisionMobile, 2012b). The value network has changed to open and modular with 
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many parties, as a consequence of the app stores. Mobile network operators have lost 
dominance over the distribution of services and interaction with end-users. 
 
According to Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) the largest difference within the 
mobile telecom industry since 2007 is that the competition for the end-user has 
relationship has increased. OTT players have introduced competition over the key links 
of the mobile value network (VisionMobile, 2012a). Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) 
says that “mobile network operators are most of all scared that they will loose more and 
more of their customer interaction”. Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) believes that 
even if mobile network operators have been partly cut of from the end-users, they still 
have a customer relations through support functions, control of billing and local presence 
to customers. He argues that the local presence is hard for OTT players to match.  
 
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) describes the mobile telecom value network in the 
following order: infrastructure providers, mobile network operators, handset OEMs, OTT 
players and end-users. He explains that mobile network operators also reach end-users 
through for example voice, data access, messaging and support. Andersson (interview, 
May 3, 2013) explains that with smartphones, handset OEMs and platforms have taken a 
larger role towards the end-users, as well as enabled OTT players to do so. Before 2007 
the operators were the ones who interacted with the customers, but they have lost much 
of that position. 
 
Based on the above discussion by VisionMobile (2012b), Constantinou (interview, April 
11, 2013), Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) VisionMobile (2012a), Selén (interview, 
April 23, 2013) and Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) we have designed two figures to 
illustrate the difference between the mobile telecom value networks in 2007 and now, see 
Figure 11 and 12. These are simplified versions of the mobile telecom value network, 
numerous other linkages could certainly be added. However, the figures are efficient in 
comparing the differences in the value network from a mobile network operators’ 
perspective, and shows how they have lost dominance over the interaction with end-
users. The figures represent the shift caused by smartphones, although Figure 11 can still 
be a relevant value network for conventional phones.  
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Figure 11: Illustration of the mobile telecom value network in 2007 based on VisionMobile (2012b) 
Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013), Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) VisionMobile (2012a), 
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) and Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Illustration of the contemporary mobile telecom value network based on VisionMobile (2012b), 
Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013), Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) VisionMobile (2012a), 
Selén (interview, April 23, 2013) and Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013).  
 
VisionMobile (2012b) does portray the mobile telecom value network from another 
perspective, see Figure 13. Old and new players rival for control over the end-to-end 
value network (VisionMobile, 2012b). Mobile network operators have lost control over 
the value network and OTT players have gained control. OTT players even challenge 
mobile network operators’ core services like voice and messaging through apps like 
Skype, Viber and WhatsApp. The infrastructure providers are not included in this 
perspective.   
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Figure 13. The mobile telecom network in accordance with VisionMobile (2012b).  
 
Mobile network operators could also reach end-users through their own stores, but this 
differs from different regions. Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013) explains that in 
the United States many end-users buy their mobile phones from the mobile network 
operators’ own stores. In Europe about 50 % of the end-users buy their mobile phones 
from distributers, and the others from the mobile network operators’ own stores. In Asia 
many end-users buy their mobile phones from distributers, but in countries like China, 
Japan and North Korea, the mobile network operators’ own stores do have quit strong 
positions. 
 
Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013) explains that mobile network operators have 
been outsourcing more and more of their infrastructure to the infrastructure providers 
since 2007. For example Orange and Vodafone have both outsourced their mobile 
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network operations and maintenance, as a way to save costs (Outsource magazine, 2009). 
Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) argues that this is a way for infrastructure providers 
to advance positions in hope for better margins. Mobile network operators see it as an 
opportunity to decrease fixed costs and lower total costs, since infrastructure providers 
who can specialize in running mobile networks and can benefit from economies of scale. 
However, he further argues that it could be a threat if mobile network operators outsource 
too much. But he explains that from a strategic point of view: “It is the end-user 
relationship that mobile network operators do not want to outsource”. 
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5.	  Analysis	  
 
The analysis chapter begins with an introduction of the analysis. The factors in the 
theoretical framework are then analyzed in relation to the case study in order to provide 
theoretical findings. Additional factors that were found though the case study are 
presented thereafter. The chapter ends with a revised theoretical framework and an 
assessment framework.  
	  	  
5.1	  Introduction	  of	  analysis 
5.1.1	  What	  is	  the	  disruptive	  innovation? 
One issue we faced when examining the mobile telecom industry is, what exactly is the 
disruptive innovation in this case? Is it the hardware smartphones with their 
touchscreens? Or is it rather the platforms or the apps that were introduced through them? 
The disruptive innovation was discussed in the background of this thesis, but we want to 
clarify the previous mentioned questions further. The reason is that we want to be able to 
pinpoint what the effects of disruptive innovation has been in this case, since it enables us 
to determine if different factors can be affected by disruptive innovation.    
 
The smartphones initially introduced a performance package that was inferior to what 
mainstream customers valued and served a niche segment of business people instead, 
which is in accordance with Christensen’s (2013) definition of disruptive innovation. 
Both the smartphones and the conventional phones improved, and the smartphone 
improved enough to eventually start to replace the conventional phones, especially after 
the launch of iPhone in 2007 and its app store one year later. The annual smartphone 
sales worldwide have gone from 11 % of the mobile phone market in 2007 to an 
estimated 51 % in 2013 and the pattern is even stronger in the developed countries. Thus, 
we argue that the smartphone itself can be seen as a new performance package and a 
disruptive innovation.  
 
The smartphones platforms have enabled OTT players, which have introduced a number 
of new services that could be seen as disruptive innovation. The OTT players have for 
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example introduced voice apps and messaging apps that challenge the mobile network 
operators’ traditional voice and messaging services. Furthermore, they have replaced 
much of the mobile network operator portals. 
 
The smartphone can be considered high-end disruptive innovation in accordance with 
Govindarajan & Kopalle (2006), since they have higher per-unit margin than 
conventional phones. Many of the OTT services, can on the other hand be considered 
low-end disruptions since they offer lower quality, in accordance with Christensen & 
Raynor (2003) – for example lower quality of voice calling on apps.  
 
To summarize the above, a disruptive product innovation can be identified, the 
smartphone, which has enabled a number of other disruptive service innovations through 
the platforms and OTT players. The platforms and OTT players have also enabled the 
smartphones to start replacing conventional phones, which means that they are 
complementors to each other, in accordance with Yoffie & Kwak’s (2006) definition of 
complementors. Since smartphones, platforms and OTT players have had vast influence 
on each other during their development and grown simultaneously, we continue to refer 
to them as one performance package when we mention the disruptive innovation in this 
analysis.   
 
5.1.2	  Other	  considerations	  for	  the	  analysis 
The empirical analysis has focused on the effects due to disruptive innovation from a 
mobile network operators’ perspective. The focus has been on smartphones, but it is 
important to not forget that the mobile network operators still sell conventional phones, 
especially in the developing world. But to see the effects of the disruptive innovation, it 
has been relevant for us to focus on smartphones.   
 
This thesis focus on the mobile network operators as one industry, but it is important to 
point out that the effects of the disruptive innovation can vary in different countries. The 
effects of disruptive innovation should be clearer in developed countries if you consider 
that the smartphone penetration is higher in developed countries than developing 
countries. 
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Christensen & Raynor (2003) describes disruptive innovation as a process rather than an 
event, which applies to the disruptive innovation in the mobile telecom industry. Selén 
(interview, April 23, 2013) states that there are no revolutions in the telecom industry but 
rather transformations that take time. This indicates that disruptive innovation in the 
mobile telecom industry takes time, and this is strengthened by the fact that the usage of 
smartphones has increased gradually over time. As a consequence we may not have seen 
the full effects of the disruptive innovation yet, and the effects can become more evident 
with time. 
 
5.2	  Structure	  and	  bargaining	  power	  in	  value	  networks 
The mobile network operators have lost their dominance in the value network over the 
end-user relationship to the platforms and OTT players. The lost dominance can make it 
difficult for mobile network operators to differentiate themselves towards end-users. In 
addition the mobile network operators have also lost some influence over end-users to 
handset OEMs. Porter (2008) states that differentiation and switching costs can create 
bargaining power, and the handset OEMs have been able to differentiate themselves with 
smartphone branding and platforms have been able to create switching costs through 
lock-in effects.  
 
Mobile network operators still have interaction with end-users, for example through their 
services, local presence, billing and support functions. Nevertheless, we argue that there 
is still a clear change due to the disruptive innovation – more players have been 
introduced into the value network and compete over power. Therefore, we claim that 
value networks and bargaining power can be affected by disruptive innovation. 
 
Value chains can change fast by disruption from unexpected players according to Sargut 
& McGrath (2011). In 2007 the mobile network operators completely dominated content 
distribution, but now the platforms and the app stores account for 94 % of the content 
downloads on phones worldwide. Normann (2001) states that it is no longer about who 
can be positioned best in the value network, but rather who can find the most creative 
ways to create value. Thus we argue that the OTT players can respond to the end-users 
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needs better and create more value for them compared to the operator portals. Hence 
value networks and bargaining power can change because other players create more value 
as an effect of disruptive innovation. 
 
Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) argues that the realization of value is determined by the 
bargaining relationships, and Cox (2001) says that value migrates in the direction of 
power. Johnson et al. (2008a) explain that different levels of profits are available to 
different parts of the value network, depending on the competitive intensity. Since the 
competitive intensity has increased over the end-user interaction for the mobile network 
operators it may influence their profitability. This means that changes in a value network 
or bargaining power due to a disruptive innovation can cause other factors to change, for 
example value migration. This is an example of how one factor is influenced by 
disruptive innovation and then is able to influence other factors.  
 
Since 2007 many mobile network operators have been outsourcing more of their 
infrastructure to the infrastructure providers. It is possible that this is an effect of 
disruptive innovation, since the mobile network operators for example may have been 
pressured by the disruptive innovation and therefore searched for new ways to reduce 
costs. However, these connections are not clear, and we can therefore not conclude the 
outsourcing as an effect of the disruptive innovation. 
 
5.3	  Value	  migration 
5.3.1	  Introduction 
According to Slywotzky (1996) there are three phases of value migration and these are 
the value inflow, value stability and value outflow phase. We have decided to examine if 
disruptive innovation affects value migration within a company, between companies and 
between industries. To do this we have applied the different parts of the mobile network 
operators’ business designs to the phases to see how well they create value and were 
value is migrating.  
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5.3.2	  Value	  migration	  analysis 
Value migration within a company can be described by studying the revenue growth 
curves. Sharma (2012a) describes how the mobile network operators’ revenue growth for 
different segments should be correlated with the subscription growth for the segments. 
The mobile network operators’ business should be divided into voice, message and data 
access and compared to the subscriber penetration for each examined segment. 
 
The revenue growth curves for the different segments vary in different countries and 
especially between the developed and developed countries. If the first revenue growth 
curve, voice, is studied for the mobile network operators it is declining for most of the 
developed countries while it is on the rise for the developing countries (Sharma, 2012a). 
If this were put in relation to the value migrations phases, voice for the developed 
countries would be placed in the value outflow phase (see Figure 14). The value outflow 
phase is characterized by competitive intensity, declining sales and low profits 
(Slywotzky, 1996). Voice for the developed countries would be placed here based on the 
declining revenues and increasing competition the traditional voice services are 
experiencing from the OTT players voice apps. In the developing countries the subscriber 
penetration and the revenues are increasing, which would place voice in the value inflow 
phase which is characterized by high growth, high profitability and limited competition 
(see Figure 14). 
 
The second revenue curve, messaging, is rising in the developing countries due to the 
previously mentioned increased subscriber penetration as well as increasing revenues for 
messaging (Sharma, 2012a). The messaging in the developing countries can therefore be 
considered to be in the same phase as voice, the value inflow phase, since the number of 
subscriptions and revenues are rising (see Figure 14). The revenue growth curve for 
messaging has started to decline in some of the developed countries and the competition 
is increasing due to the OTT players’ apps for messaging. Andersson (interview, May 3, 
2013) believes that the messaging business will be the first thing lost by the mobile 
network operators in the competition with the OTT players. The value stability phase is 
characterized by stable margins, stable market share and competitive stability 
(Slywotzky, 1996). The declining revenue growth curve for some countries and the 
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increasing competition would place messaging for the developed countries in the 
transition between the value stability and the value outflow phase (see Figure 14). 
 
The third revenue curve, data access, is currently rising in both the developed and 
developing countries and this growth is expected to continue for the next 3-4 years 
(Sharma, 2012a). This would place data access in the value inflow phase because of the 
increasing revenues and the growth potential (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14: Voice, messaging and data for the developed and developing countries placed in the phases of 
value migration within a company. 
 
Value migration between companies has been studied through the 12 mobile network 
operators in our data analysis. We examined profit margins and EBITDA margins for the 
chosen mobile network operators between 2007 and 2011. Our results show that the 
individual companies margins have fluctuated, some more than others, but it is not 
possible to identify any clear patterns. The observed companies are operating in different 
regions and countries and our data analysis only provides a sample of the mobile network 
operators in the world, so it is not possible to determine if the cause of the fluctuations. 
 
According to Selén (interview, April 23, 2013 the mobile telecom industry demands large 
investments for the required infrastructure and licenses. This gives the industry some 
characteristics that differ from other industries since the mobile network operators do not 
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compete with each other straightforward. The required licenses and investments make it 
difficult for mobile network operators to enter new markets and the threat of new 
competitors entering low. As a result the competition among the mobile network 
operators can be considered to be stable, as well as the market shares. In terms of value 
migration between companies we have therefore determined the mobile network 
operators to be in the value stability phase mainly because the competition and market 
shares remain stable (see Figure 15). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The mobile network operators placed in the model of the phases of value migration between 
companies. 
 
When the value migration between industries is studied we consider the mobile network 
operators as a group to be in the transition of phases, positioned between the value 
stability and the value outflow phase (see Figure 16). According to our data analysis the 
mobile network operators average profit and EBITDA margins are rather stable, even if 
the individual companies have fluctuating margins. The mobile network operators market 
share in the mobile telecom industry has been reduced from 77 % in 2008 to 74 % in 
2011 but it can still be considered to be fairly stable. The competition in the mobile 
telecom industry has completely changed and there are a larger number of parties that are 
competing for the end-user’s attention now compared to 2007 (Rådström, interview, 
April 29, 2013). According to Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013) value is 
migrating of out the mobile network operators since end-users are not willing to pay more 
!
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for voice and for messaging. In addition the mobile network operators portals have faded 
in importance and only account for 6 % of the content downloads on mobile phones 
worldwide today. This means that the mobile network operators are experiencing greater 
competition and not the competitive stability that the value stability phase represents. 
Therefore the mobile network operators can be considered to be in the transition of 
phases, which according to Slywotzky (1996) can be triggered by innovation. 
Furthermore both Constantinou (interview, May 8, 2013) and Andersson (interview, May 
3, 2013) imply that talent and capital may be moving out of the mobile network 
operators, which is consistent with the value outflow phase.  
 
The mobile network operators are experiencing an intensifying competition, which is 
consistent with the value outflow phase. However, the mobile network operators are not 
facing the other characteristics of the value outflow phase, low profits and declining 
sales. The revenues have increased for the majority of the 12 observed mobile network 
operators in our data analysis and the number of subscriptions have increased for all the 
studied companies. The average revenue per unit, ARPU, has however declined for all 
the mobile network operators in our analysis. This indicates that their revenues are not 
growing as fast as the number of subscribers, and as a consequence they are making less 
money for each additional subscription. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The mobile network operators placed in the model of the phases of value migration between 
industries. 
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5.3.3	  Results 
According to Slywotzky (1996) value migration occurs when value moves from outdated 
business designs to new ones that better satisfy the customers’ priorities. In our value 
migration analysis above we have been able to identify value migration within a company 
and between industries. 
 
The customers perceptions of value has changed as the mobile network operators 
traditional services of voice and messaging have been challenged by the OTT players 
communication apps for voice and messaging. This is consistent with what Slywotzky 
(1996) defines as the driving force of value migration, which is how customers view the 
value of a business designs and how it matches their priorities in relation to the 
competitors. 
 
We have not observed any clear signs of value migration between the mobile network 
operators in our data analysis. We have been able to identify some fluctuations between 
the companies, but we have not been able to draw any conclusions whether these are 
effects of disruptive innovation. The fluctuations shown by the companies in our data 
analysis may be a result of value migration caused by the disruptive innovation, but it 
might just as well be a result of for example macroeconomic effects or regulations. 
 
To summarize our value migration analysis we have seen that value has migrated within 
the mobile network operators and between industries in mobile telecom as a result of the 
disruptive innovation. The value has begun to migrate from the mobile network operators 
to other parties in the value network such as OTT players. The value within the mobile 
network operators has started to migrate from voice and messaging to data access. Thus, 
we can conclude that disruptive innovation can cause value to migrate within companies 
and between industries. 
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5.4	  Changes	  at	  an	  industry	  level 
5.4.1	  Basis	  of	  competition 
Christensen et al. (2001) argue that disruptive competitors can start to replace established 
offerings due to a shift in the basis of competition to focus on price, flexibility, 
convenience or customization. The change from mobile telephony to mobile computing, 
i.e. the disruptive innovation, has transformed the basis of competition within the mobile 
telecom industry. It has gone from reliability and scale of networks, to an environment 
where choice and flexibility of services is more valued by end-users. Christensen et al. 
(2001) sees the shift in the basis of competition as an enabler for disruptive innovation, 
however in this case we see that the disruptive innovation has changed the basis of 
competition. Hence, we claim that disruptive innovation can affect basis of competition. 
 
5.4.2	  Market	  shares 
Christiansen (2013) states that disruptive innovation eventually replaces established 
offerings. An example of this in our case is that the mobile network operator portals have 
been replaced by platforms to a large extent. However, when it comes to voice and 
messaging we can see that the mobile network operators have been threatened by OTT 
players’ voice and messaging apps, but not yet replaced. Christensen & Raynor (2003) 
explain that there are exceptions when leading companies manage to stay on top despite a 
disruptive innovation. We argue that the mobile network operators have been able to 
hinder some of the effects of the disruptive innovation by bundling their offers to make 
the OTT players less relevant. However, based on that the mobile network operators have 
lost most market shares of content for mobile phones and that other services have been 
threatened, we claim that market shares can affect due to disruptive innovation. 
 
5.4.3	  Market	  size 
Markides (2006) and Christensen & Raynor (2003) agree that disruptive innovation can 
enlarge the market size. The total mobile telecom market has grown in size since 2007, 
but much of it may be a result of growth in subscriptions and not a consequence of 
disruptive innovation. Nevertheless, data access and content revenue for mobile phones 
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has grown rapidly during the last couple of years, as an effect of increased usage of apps. 
Therefore, market size has been affected by the disruptive innovation. Hence, disruptive 
innovation can affect market size. 
 
5.4.4	  Customer	  Behavior 
Both Constantinou (interview, March 21, 2013) and Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) 
argue that the choice of mobile phone is more important today, rather than the choice of 
mobile network operator. The end-users have started to use their mobile phones for a 
wide range of new areas and consume much more data access. Hence, this case supports 
Markides (2006) arguments that disruptive innovation can affect the behaviors and habits 
of customers. 
 
5.5	  Changes	  at	  a	  firm	  level 
5.5.1	  Profit	  formulas	  and	  customer	  value	  propositions 
Magretta (2002), Amit & Zott (2001) and Johnson et al. (2008b) agree that business 
models should generate profit and deliver value to customers. Amit & Zott (2012) sees 
changes in business models as a way to create new value. Constantinou (interview, April 
11, 2013) argues that mobile network operators are still mainly addressing 
communication needs like voice, messaging and data access. However, the mobile 
network operators have changed their offerings due to competition from OTT players. 
They bundle services instead of charging per unit, and focus more on selling data access. 
Furthermore, the mobile network operators try to offer new services, for example apps of 
their own. Hence, the mobile network operators have changed their customer value 
propositions, due to the disruptive innovation. Thus, disruptive innovation can effect 
customer value propositions. 
 
The mobile network operators’ profit formulas have also been changed. Some changes 
are hard to link to the disruptive innovation since lower prices for an overall volume of 
services can for example be an effect of technological advances as well. Nevertheless, the 
mobile network operators’ revenue models of their profit formulas focus more on data 
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access as a steam of revenue, rather than voice and messaging. The costs of developing 
portals and the opportunities to charge for distributing services through them must also 
logically have decreased due to the decreased usage of them. Therefore we argue that 
disruptive innovation can influence profit formulas. 
 
5.5.2	  Key	  resources 
It is hard to determine a precise connection between the mobile network operators’ 
infrastructure and licenses and the disruptive innovation. Since the value of data access 
has increased, while voice and messaging have been threatened, it is possible to argue 
that the disruptive innovation has changed the value of these resources. The mobile 
network operators’ key assets have also gradually been replaced due to the emergence 
apps, for example location and authentication. Furthermore, both Constantinou 
(interview, May 8, 2013) and Andersson (interview, May 3, 2013) imply that it may be 
less attractive to work for mobile network operators today. 
 
5.5.3	  Key	  processes 
We have not been able to identify any major changes in key processes within mobile 
network operators due to the disruptive innovation through interviews or other sources. 
Although minor changes in processes most likely have occurred and possibly larger ones 
that our sources cannot identify, it is not enough to clearly state that disruptive innovation 
can change key process based on this information.  
 
5.5.4	  Changes	  in	  business	  models 
Christensen (2013) explains that disruptive innovations are introduced through business 
models with different performance packages. However, the changes for mobile network 
operators in profit formulas, customer value propositions and key resources demonstrate 
that disruptive innovation also can cause existing business models to change. 
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5.6	  Additional	  findings 
5.6.1	  Complementor	  opportunities	   
Christensen & Raynor (2003) state that many disruptive innovations fail because they are 
part of a value network that cannot adapt to support the disruption. However, in this case 
the value network could adapt to support the disruptive innovation, since the mobile 
network operators could support it by providing data access. 
 
Yoffie & Kwak (2006) argue that complementors provide products or services that 
increase the value of each other’s offerings in the customers’ eyes. Customers require 
data access in order to use OTT players’ apps; the better quality and price on data access, 
the more value OTT players can provide. Usage of data access is based on customers that 
are provided with content on their mobile phones. Mobile network operators are therefore 
to a large extent dependent on OTT players in order to sell data access. This makes the 
OTT players and mobile network operators’ data access complementors. 
 
According to Yoffie & Kwak (2006) the demand for one product can increase if the price 
or quality for the complement is improved. This can be seen in the enormous increase of 
data access usage as a result of the platforms and apps. Although the OTT players have 
had negative effects on the mobile network operators’ voice, messaging and portals, they 
have increased the demand for the mobile operators data access. We have therefore 
identified that disruptive innovation can increase or change the opportunities for 
complementors through this case study.  
 
5.6.2	  Perceptions	  about	  the	  future 
Before the smartphones were introduced in 2007 the mobile network operators were the 
dominating party in the mobile telecom industry value network. This has changed since 
the iPhone was introduced in 2007 and a larger number of players have entered the value 
network. According to Rådström (interview, April 29, 2013) the competition has 
increased and a larger number of parties are competing for the end-user’s attention. The 
mobile network operators’ business environment has changed and they need to adapt to 
the new surroundings to be able to maintain their profitability. 
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Constantinou (interview, April 11, 2013) explains that all the mobile network operators 
are worried about how they are going to compete in the future. Selén (interview, April 23, 
2013) argues that the mobile network operators primarily are scared that they will loose 
their customer interaction. This indicates that the mobile network operators are concerned 
about the changes caused by the disruptive innovation and that they have realized that the 
mobile telecom industry has changed. Therefore we claim that perceptions about the 
future can be affected by the disruptive innovation.  
 
5.7	  Revised	  theoretical	  framework 
We have created a revised theoretical framework based on the analysis, see Table 6. It 
includes the additional findings, which are complementor opportunities and perceptions 
about the future. It also summarizes our findings about the mobile network operators to 
see in which degree our theoretical descriptions of the factors comply with the case study. 
The descriptions in the column description of factors are based on the theoretical 
framework, except the two additional factors which are based on the analysis.  
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Factors   Description of factors  Found effects on mobile network operators 
 
Degree of 
compliance 
Basis of competition The basis of competition can change to price, 
flexibility, convenience or customization. 
From reliability and scale of network, to an 
environment where choice and flexibility of 
services is more prominent. 
Strong 
Market shares 
 
Disruptive innovation can eventually replace 
established offerings and incumbents.  
The mobile network operator portals have been 
replaced by platforms to a large extent, while other 
services have been threatened but not yet replaced.   
Strong 
Market size  
 
 
 
 
The industry can be enlarged when new 
customers are attracted and existing customers 
consume more.  
 
Service content revenue for mobile phones and 
data access and has grown rapidly. 
Strong 
Customer behavior The customers’ behaviors and habits can 
significantly change. 
The end-users have started to use their mobile 
phones for a wide range of new areas and consume 
much more data access. 
Strong 
 
Value migration 
within a company 
Value can move from outdated business 
designs to new ones within a company that 
better satisfy the customers’ priorities.  
Value has stated to migrate from voice and 
messaging to data access.  
Strong 
Value migration 
between companies 
Value can move from outdated business 
designs to new ones in other companies that 
better satisfy the customers’ priorities. 
Our analysis could not prove a clear pattern of 
value migration between mobile network operators 
caused by the disruptive innovation.  
Weak 
Value migration 
between industries 
Value can move from outdated business 
designs to new ones in other industries that 
better satisfy the customers’ priorities. 
Value has started to migrate from the mobile 
network operators to other players such as OTT 
players.  
Strong 
Bargaining power  Bargaining power of relationships between 
firms can change. 
Platforms and OTT players have started to 
compete over power with the mobile network 
operators. The mobile network operators have also 
lost bargaining power to handset OEMs.  
Strong 
Customer value 
proposition 
Value proposition, the sum of total benefits 
offered in in return for a payment, can change.  
 
The mobile network operators bundle services, 
focus more on selling data access and try to offer 
new services. 
Strong 
Profit formula Profit formula, the blueprint of how a 
company creates value for itself, can change. 
The mobile network operators focus more on data 
access and their portal costs and revenues have 
decreased.  
Strong 
Key resources Key resources, the assets that are crucial when 
delivering value, can change.  
The mobile network operators’ resources have 
been affected, for example the value of 
infrastructure, licenses and authentication has 
changed.  
Strong 
Key processes Key processes, the operational and managerial 
processes that allow companies to deliver 
value, can change.  
No major changes within mobile network 
operators’ key processes due to the disruptive 
innovation can be identified. 
Weak 
Value network 
structures  
The value network structures, how the value-
adding activities are linked, can change.  
 
More players have been introduced in the value 
network that compete over interaction and control 
over the end-users. 
Strong 
Complementor 
opportunities 
(additional finding) 
Opportunities for complementors can increase 
or change.  
The mobile network operators’ data access has 
increased due to the emergence of OTT players.  
Strong 
Perceptions about 
the future 
(additional finding) 
Perceptions about the future can change.  The mobile network operators have become more 
concerned about their future.  
Strong 
Table 6: Revised theoretical framework based on the findings in the analysis. 	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5.8	  Assessment	  framework 
We have revised the theoretical framework of this thesis based on the findings in our 
analysis in relation to the mobile telecom industry. By doing so we have created an 
assessment framework, see Figure 17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Assessment framework based on the findings in the analysis. 
 
All factors in Figure 17 do not have to be affected by all disruptive innovations, as we 
have seen in the mobile telecom industry. We could not identify any major changes in 
key processes within the mobile network operators nor any value migration between 
mobile network operators based on the disruptive innovation. However, we see no reason 
to why these factors could not be affected by disruptive innovation, thus the analysis of 
the mobile telecom industry is not enough to refute them. This means that the assessment 
framework is a list of potential factors, and not factors that are affected in all disruptive 
innovations. This is in accordance with the purpose of this thesis. We have also found 
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• Basis of competition 
• Market shares 
• Market size 
• Customer behavior 
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    affected by another factor.!
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two new factors in the analysis, which are complementor opportunities and perceptions 
about the future. 
 
In the analysis we have discussed how changes in the value networks or bargaining 
power which is caused by disruptive innovation, can effect value migration. Another 
example is that Slywotzky (1996) argues that one of the driving forces of value migration 
is what customers want, need and are willing to pay for. This means that changes in 
customer behavior caused by disruptive innovation can cause value migration. It could 
also be argued that for example changes in customer value proposition could affect 
market size, bargaining power or market shares. In fact, we argue through logical 
reasoning that all of these factors can indirectly be influenced by disruptive innovation 
through changes in other factors. 
 
An important point that we have examined in our analysis is that a disruptive innovation 
processes vary in length. This means that it may vary in time when a factor is influenced 
in different disruptive innovation processes.  
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6.	  Conclusions 
 
The conclusions chapter presents the results of the analysis and discusses how they match 
the purpose of this thesis. At the end of the chapter proposals for future research are 
presented.  
	  	  
6.1	  Research	  results 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to provide an assessment framework of potential 
effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level. We have presented 13 factors that 
can be affected by disruptive innovations through our theoretical framework. We found 
two additional factors in our analysis of the case study. The result is the assessment 
framework that is presented in Figure 17, which achieves our purpose.  
 
This thesis has examined disruptive innovation by focusing on its effects, which differs 
from the focus of previous authors of disruptive innovation. There has been no previous 
extensive research on the overall effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level 
according to our literature review. The assessment framework summarizes potential 
factors that can be affected by disruptive innovation to meet the theoretical problem of 
this thesis. 
 
6.2	  Results	  discussion	  and	  implications	  for	  managers 
Disruptive innovation has reshaped numerous industries, and has drawn the attention of 
both scholars and practitioners. Christensen (2006) recognizes that the building of theory 
on disruptive innovation is an ongoing process, and our findings add to this process. Our 
research extends theory on disruptive innovation and therefore contributes to the field of 
business research. 
 
Our assessment framework can be used either ex-ante to analyze possible future effects 
of an upcoming disruptive innovation at an industry level, or ex-post to understand how 
an industry has changed. It can be used for academic purposes or by practitioners such as 
managers that make strategic decisions. Christensen (2006) and Govindarajan & Kopalle 
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(2006) state that it is possible to make predictions if a disruptive innovations will occur. 
This should be determined before the assessment framework can be applied. When 
managers have used the assessment framework, we recommend that they determine if the 
effects of the disruptive innovations create risks or opportunities for the managers’ 
organization before they make strategic decisions. 
 
The assessment framework can for example help managers identify potential 
opportunities for complementors that may occur through the disruptive innovation. 
According to Christensen (2013) disruptive innovation can replace established players, so 
the opportunities to produce complementing services or products could be immense. 
Thus, managers can decide to invest in production of complementary products by 
understanding the effects of a disruptive innovation, and generate profits by doing so in 
time. Even though the situation has to be thoroughly assessed before a decision is made, 
the assessment framework gives good guidance of which factors to assess. 
 
The assessment framework can also show managers that a disruptive innovation can 
change the basis of competition at an industry level. Thus, managers can try to 
understand how and search for opportunities to realize profits or minimize risks from the 
disruptive innovation. In addition to the above mentioned examples, the assessment 
framework can also be used for a number of other situations to manage disruptive 
innovation.  
 
Theories on disruptive innovation argue that disruptive innovation decrease opportunities 
for existing players. We have however been able to confirm that it also can increase 
opportunities for some existing players, as for example complementors or others who 
understand the effects of a disruptive innovation and make correct strategic decisions as a 
consequence. We have studied the effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level 
and that increases the relevance for individual companies since managers need to 
understand the entire industry in order to make the correct strategic decisions.   
 
The mobile network operators can be characterized by extensive infrastructure, licenses 
and slow-moving organizations. These circumstances may have influenced which factors 
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we found to be affected by disruptive innovation, but our assessment framework does not 
include any parameters that are specific to the mobile telecom industry. This makes our 
assessment framework applicable to other industries were it can be used to assess 
potential effects of disruptive innovation. All industries are not affected the same, but we 
argue that the assessment can be used to identify new disruptions in a number of 
industries as for example media and clean technology.  
  
6.3	  Mobile	  network	  operators	   
The secondary purpose of this thesis was to describe how the mobile network operators 
have been affected due to the disruptive innovation in the mobile telecom industry. The 
purpose has been achieved through our theoretical framework, case study of the mobile 
network operators and analysis. The effects are summarized in Table 6 in the analysis 
chapter.  
 
The findings of our secondary purpose contribute empirically to research on the mobile 
telecom industry since it shows how the industry has been affected by the disruptive 
innovation. The importance of our findings can be accentuated by that the mobile telecom 
industry represent 2 % of world GDP, and the mobile network operators comprise 74 % 
of the revenue. Practitioners can use the findings to gain further knowledge of how the 
mobile telecom industry has changed due to disruptive innovation. The mobile network 
operators can use our assessment framework when new disruptive innovations occur to 
understand the effects, and thus realize their opportunities and possibilities to minimize 
risk.  
 
6.4	  Reflection	  of	  results 
While we acknowledge the value of the assessment framework we also recognize its 
shortcomings. Firstly, our study has thoroughly covered research on the field and 
examined effects of disruptive innovation at an industry level, but there may still be a 
number of factors that the case study and previous research have not uncovered yet. 
Therefore, the assessment framework cannot assure that all potential effects are examined 
when it is used, but it still provides good assistance to which factors to examine. 
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Secondly, the assessment framework provides factors that can be affected, but it does not 
specify in detail how the factors may be affected. Although such details would improve 
the assessment framework, it would be difficult to provide more detailed information 
since disruptive innovation can create such wide effects. Thirdly, the assessment 
framework does not explain how long it will take before the effects occur, which would 
be beneficial to the assessment framework, but the length of disruptive processes vary. 
 
6.5	  Proposals	  for	  future	  research 
Through our theoretical framework we have provided potential effects of disruptive 
innovation at an industry level, which has been tested and elaborated through our case 
study. The case study revealed further factors that were added to our assessment 
framework and this shows that case studies can uncover potential effects of disruptive 
innovation. We therefore suggest that more case studies can be conducted to see if any 
additional potential effects of disruptive innovation are to be revealed. These case studies 
should be conducted in a variety of industries in order to provide more diverse results. 
 
The effects of disruptive innovation on the factors in our assessment framework occur at 
different times during processes of disruptive innovation. It may be possible to classify 
different factors depending on their order of appearance rather than when in time they 
occur. This could possibly help managers to understand which factors they should focus 
on first, therefore create better decisions. It could also help them to see early signals of an 
upcoming disruptive innovation. Therefore we suggest further research on classification 
of the potential effects depending on which order they occur. 
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Appendices	  	  
	  	  	  
Appendix 1: The number of mobile subscriptions in the world, developed and developing 
countries, based on data from ITU (2013).  	  	  
  	  
Appendix 2: The number of mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants for the world, 
developed and developing countries, based on data from ITU (2013).    
	  
	  
	  	  
Appendix 3: Profit margins for the observed companies based on the companies’ annual 
report 2007-2011. 	  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
+Developed+ !!!!!!1,243! !!!!!!1,325! !!!!!!1,383! !!!!!!1,418! !!!!!!1,475!
+Developing+ !!!!!!2,125! !!!!!!2,705! !!!!!!3,257! !!!!!!3,901! !!!!!!4,487!
+World+ !!!!!!3,368! !!!!!!4,030! !!!!!!4,640! !!!!!!5,320! !!!!!!5,962!
Mobile+subscriptions+(Million)
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
+Developed+ !!!!!!102.0! !!!!!!108.3! !!!!!!112.5! !!!!!!115.0! !!!!!!119.0!
+Developing+ !!!!!!!!39.1! !!!!!!!!49.1! !!!!!!!!58.3! !!!!!!!!69.0! !!!!!!!!78.3!
+World+ !!!!!!!!50.6! !!!!!!!!59.8! !!!!!!!!68.1! !!!!!!!!77.2! !!!!!!!!85.5!
Mobile+subscriptions+per+100+inhabitants
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
AT&T 9.8% 10.2% 15.6% 25.9% 13.4%
Nippon 4.5% 5.9% 5.2% 4.8% 4.9%
Verizon 5.9% 6.6% 10.8% 9.7% 9.2%
China7Mobile 24.4% 27.4% 25.5% 24.7% 23.8%
KDDI 7.8% 9.3% 10.0% 11.1% 8.3%
Softbank 1.1% 3.9% 1.6% 3.5% 6.1%
Telstra 13.9% 26.0% 27.1% 15.8% 13.0%
China7Unicom 10.8% 5.2% 5.6% 1.8% 1.7%
BCE 22.6% 5.3% 9.8% 12.2% 13.4%
Telia7Sonera 21.1% 20.7% 19.5% 22.0% 20.2%
Telenor 20.8% 15.4% 10.3% 15.6% 7.3%
Tele72 -0.2% 4.6% 12.3% 16.1% 12.0%
Profit7Margin7(Net7income/7Revenue)
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Appendix 4: EBITDA margins for the observed companies, based on the companies’ 
annual report 2007-2011. 	  	  
	  	  
Appendix 5: Percentage change of ARPU per year for the observed companies, based on 
the companies’ annual report 2007-2011. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
AT&T 33% 34% 37% 37% 34%
Nippon3Telegraph3&3Tel 31% 34% 32% 32% 32%
Verizon3Communications 39% 35% 39% 41% 38%
China3Mobile 54% 53% 51% 49% 48%
KDDI 22% 24% 30% 31% 30%
Softbank 22% 24% 26% 30% 32%
Telstra 42% 42% 43% 44% 40%
China3Unicom 48% 43% 38% 35% 44%
BCE 40% 40% 40% 35% 35%
Telia3Sonera 33% 34% 34% 35% 36%
Telenor 32% 31% 32% 30% 31%
Tele32 23% 27% 26% 28% 27%
EBITDA3Margin3(EBITDA/Revenue)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011
AT&T 3% #1% #1% 0%
Nippon2Telegraph2&2Tel #6% #6% #5% #3%
Verizon2Communications 1% #5% 0% 2%
China2Mobile #4% #2% #2% #1%
KDDI 0% #3% #3% #3%
Softbank #2% #7% 1% #1%
Telstra 5% #1% 1% #2%
China2Unicom #3% 0% 5% 8%
BCE 2% #2% 1% 2%
Telia2Sonera #7% #4% #8% #6%
Telenor #5% #2% #4% #5%
Tele2 #3% #6% #4% #2%
Percentage2change2of2ARPU2yearLbyLyear
